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Minority Politics in Ethnofederal States: 








Leaders of minority communities in multinational states have taken one of three positions 
when interacting with their central governments. They have accepted the institutional 
status quo; they have pressed for moderate changes, such as increased cultural and 
political autonomy; or they have demanded a state of their own. What explains this 
variation? The purpose of this paper is to develop an answer by comparing political 
dynamics from 1989-2003 in nine regions located within three postcommunist 
ethnofederations: Georgia (Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia and Adjaria), Russia (Chechnya, 
Dagestan and Tatarstan) and Serbia-Montenegro (Kosovo, Montenegro and Vojvodina). 
Two conclusions are drawn. First, while many familiar economic, cultural and historical 
factors fail to explain differences across country and over time, two short-term political 
factors seem to be influential. One is variations in international support for minority 
leaders and their political agenda. The other is variations in the outcome of regional 
struggles for power once communism and the state unravel. As a result, in 
postcommunist ethnofederal states, increasing political competition creates a dilemma for 
new states in transition to democracy. While competition at the center seems to 
encourage democratization, competition in the regions threatens the state.   
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 The Importance of Minority Politics1
 
 Specialists in both comparative and international politics have devoted 
considerable attention to minority politics—for example, such issues as identity 
formation, the rise and impact of nationalist movements, the political consequences of 
institutional design in divided societies, the politics of secession, the sources of inter-
ethnic conflict and cooperation, and peace-making and democracy-building after internal 
wars. Scholarly preoccupation with such topics is not surprising. The vast majority of 
states in the international system are multinational and/or multi-religious, with many 
minorities in these settings sharing attributes that are widely-thought to politicize 
diversity and thereby provide significant challenges to the survival of both regimes and 
states—for instance, a history of tensions between minorities and majorities, territorial 
concentration of minority communities within states, asymmetric distributions of political 
power and socio-economic resources that favor some cultural communities over others, 
location of minorities on the perimeters of the state, and the existence of co-nationals in 
neighboring states (Horowitz, 1985; Brubaker, 1996; Bunce, 2006a, 1999b; Toft, 2003; 
Barany, 2002; Varsnhney, 2002). 
What also seem to politicize diversity are two other conditions well-represented 
among countries around the globe: weak states that lack capacity to control borders, 
collect revenues and monopolize the use of violence, and authoritarian regimes that are 
giving way to more competitive orders, but in fragile political contexts where 
authoritarian rule had segmented cultural communities, played favorites among them, and 
used violence against some others (Beissinger, 2002; Bunce, 2006a,1999b; Conversi, 
1993). Indeed, it is in part because of the presence of both of these factors, combined 
with some of the variables mentioned earlier, that the American-led military intervention 
in Iraq has led to internal war (Bunce, 2006a; Diamond, 2004).  
A second factor prompting widespread interest in minority issues among policy-
makers, as well as scholars, is the widespread assumption that the stability of the 
international order rests in part on unchanging state boundaries. This is an argument, for 
example, that has been used to explain the “long peace” in Europe (at least its western 
half) during the Cold War (Gaddis, 1986). International stability is necessarily threatened 
when minorities reject existing state boundaries and either try to establish a state of their 
own or merge with a neighboring state. In either case, the usual consequence is both 
violent conflict between minorities and the state and the involvement of neighboring 
states in these conflicts. These dynamics often play out, because states are jealous of their 
territory (because they fear a “bank run,” lose access to vital resources, or fear that their 
neighbors will exploit the situation), and they have the military means to stop territorial 
leakage. In addition, fluid boundaries draw neighboring countries into the ruckus, 
because minorities tend to span state boundaries; because internal wars generate 
substantial refugee populations; and because both central governments and secessionist 
groups seek external allies to support their divergent political projects (see, for example, 
Jenne, 2006). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that secessionist regions are rarely 
recognized as states by dominant actors in the international system  
                                                 
1 I thank Milt Esman, Erin Jenne, Karrie Koesel, Jay Lyall, Jonas Pontusson, Sid Tarrow, and Ekkart 
Zimmerman  for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. In addition, I thank the National Council 
for East European and Eurasian Research for their support of this project. 
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 Yet another factor enhancing interest in minority politics is the changing character 
of war. It has been widely assumed that the end of the Cold War led to a sharp increase in 
intra-state wars, with most of these wars caused by conflicts between dominant cultural 
communities and other communities co-habiting the same state. However, both 
arguments are problematic. Internal wars have been in fact the dominant form of war 
since 1945, with the frequency of such conflicts relatively steady over the entire post-
World War II period (Laitin and Fearon, 2003). At the same time, the relationship 
between internal wars and ethnic conflict needs to be more precisely-stated. While 
internal wars do not by any means always originate in tensions among nations sharing the 
same state, they nonetheless have a marked tendency to evolve over time into conflicts 
that play out along cultural lines (see, especially, Gagnon, 2005). Thus, what is important 
is less the causes of these wars than the nature of the war itself and its politicization of 
cultural difference. Also important is the fact that such wars, again in comparison with 
conflicts between states, are unusually long-lasting and unusually resistant to durable 
settlement (Walter, 2002; Hartzell, 1999; Hartzell, et.al., 2001).  
Finally and not surprisingly, given these considerations, minority politics has 
become a central issue for American foreign policy—whether policy-makers have 
confronted this point directly or paid a price (as have the target populations) by 
overlooking its centrality. With the end of the Cold War, the end as well of a paralyzed 
Security Council in the United Nations, and growing American commitment to 
democracy promotion since the 1980s, the United States has become far more willing and 
able to intervene in the domestic politics of multinational states (see, especially, Bunce, 
2006a; Finnemore, 2003). While the reasons behind American involvement in Bosnia, 
Serbia-Montenegro, Afghanistan and Iraq, together with smaller-scale engagements in 
Liberia and Haiti, have varied, the dilemmas posed by these interventions for American 
foreign policy-makers have been remarkably similar—and similarly intractable. How can 
viable states and democracies be constructed in multinational settings where inter-group 
trust is low, a history of democracy is virtually non-existent, and national minorities are 
shared among neighboring states, with most of those states weak and most of their 
regimes either authoritarian or hybrid (that is, featuring a mixture of democratic and 
authoritarian elements) (see Diamond, 2002; Schedler, 2002; Bunce, 2006a; Levitsky and 
Way, 2006)?. The United States, moreover, is likely to revisit these problems in the 
future—not just because all of the interventions since 1995 have fallen short of their 
goals and thereby invited new pressures for subsequent actions, but also because it is in 
precisely these kinds of settings where terrorists can find both refuge and recruits. 
Moreover, in a purely statistical sense (given the composition of most states in the 
international system): the more willing the United States is to intervene abroad to 
promote its values and interests, the more likely it will have to confront—whether 
American policy-makers recognize this or not—the constraints imposed by 
heterogeneous cultural contexts that have been politicized. 
 
The Puzzle of Minority-State Relations 
 
The interest of both the scholarly and policy-making community in minority 
politics, therefore, is both ample and understandable. Despite the considerable literature 
on this issue, however, we still lack compelling answers to what is perhaps the most 
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 fundamental question about the political behavior of minorities in relationship to the 
states in which they reside: why have minority leaders embraced such different political 
agendas, with variation in this instance present not just across multinational states, but 
also among regions within the same state and even over time (see, especially, Jenne, 
2006). Put simply, what we see time and again throughout the world are three different 
trajectories. One is where leaders of minority communities accept the status quo, and 
another is where such leaders seek moderate changes, such as greater cultural and 
political autonomy and/or expanded representation in central-level political institutions. 
In both cases, state borders remain intact—though the pursuit of change often generates 
tensions between the state and minority communities.  
However, there is a third option, and one that, while less common in practice, has 
nonetheless generated the most attention by both scholars and policy-makers, largely 
because of its destabilizing consequences for both states and international regions. Here, I 
refer to the secessionist option. Thus, leaders of minority communities can take the 
radical step of rejecting existing state borders and demanding a state of their own. Once 
embraced, secessionist demands have two common consequences. One is that they tend 
to lock into place, in part because struggles for political domination within minority 
regions have empowered coalitions that depend upon a radical political stance in order to 
stay in power, and in part because such demands are often both preceded and followed by 
actions on the part of the state and the international community that increase local 
grievances and thus local support for secessionist politics. For example, the central 
government can deploy military force to punish secessionist regions; the international 
community can provide weapons and signal support to these regions; or the international 
community can be too divided, given power and sovereignty concerns, to function as 
effective peace-makers. Whatever the dynamic, however, secessionist agendas, as a 
result, rarely moderate—as we see, for example, with Kosovo’s slow, but by now 
inevitable move towards independence; the outcome of the May, 2006 referendum in 
Montenegro, which has led to the creation of an independent Serbia and an independent 
Montenegro; and the continuing failure of Mikheil Saakashvili, the new President of 
Georgia who enjoys a substantial popular mandate, to bring Abkhazia and southern 
Ossetia—the two regions of Georgia most committed to independence-- back into the 
Georgian state. However, under exceptional circumstances, secessionist agendas can be 
defeated--if political leaders at the center have substantial military resources at their 
disposal, substantial domestic political support for aggressive interventions, and an 
international community that functions as bystanders to the carnage. This is the story, for 
example, of Chechnya and the Russian Federation—though it is unclear whether the 
“solution” to this very long conflict is merely a hiatus in the struggle or a fall-scale 
reintegration of this region into the Russian state. 
Their variable origins aside, however, secessionist demands on states usually lead 
in the short-term to war. This is largely because of the peculiar calculus of states. As Ruth 
McVey (1984: 13) has succinctly summarized: “The nation-state clings above all to 
territory; one of its paradoxes is that, for all its stress on the people as its basis, it will 
give up population, but not land.”  
There are, in addition, some further considerations that render these three 
scenarios of minority leader demands on the state even more puzzling. One is that 
minorities sharing the same state and, indeed, even sharing a number of other similarities 
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 that would seem to predispose them to like behavior, seem to pursue, nonetheless, quite 
different political agendas. Why, for example, have some leaders of the Basque nation 
put forward more radical demands than their counterparts in Catalonia; why have the 
leaders of Chechnya embraced far more radical goals than the leaders of Tatarstan, also 
in the Russian Federation and sharing a number of similar characteristics; and why do we 
see such a clear contrast between the politics of Northern Ireland and the politics of 
Scotland (see Conversi, 1993; Medrano, 1995; McGarry and O’Leary, 2002; Moreno, 
2001Evangelista, 2002)?  
Equally puzzling is that regional demands can change over time—whether or not 
there is a turnover in regional leadership. Here, the example of Montenegro is instructive. 
Once a firm ally of Serbia (the status quo option), the Montenegrin leadership split over 
this issue by the second half of the 1990s. A turnover in political leadership then led to a 
two-stage process of change, in which the first stage involved demands for greater 
autonomy within rump Yugoslavia and the second stage increasingly radical demands 
that by 2003 began to speak of independent statehood.  
Most studies of minority-state relations, however, have not been designed to tease 
out the sources of variations—over time and across countries and regions—in minority 
leader demands on the state. By ignoring such variations with respect to both the object 
of study and the design of the research, scholars have generated a series of arguments 
about minority demands within multinational states that may very well be flawed—in 
terms of the variables identified and with respect to their applicability across time and 
space. As a result, studies of interactions between minority leaders and their states feature 
three types of problems. One is failure to specify what demands mean. As we know from 
detailed case studies of relations between minority regions and the central government, it 
is misleading to characterize the dynamic as one of minority groups making demands on 
the state (see, especially, Csergo, 2007; Gagnon, 2001, 2005). This framing is simply too 
aggregated to be of much analytical use; it often confuses the consequences of bargaining 
with its causes (for example, demands versus the conflicts that ensue); and it overlooks 
the fact that the key issue is interactions between two sets of political leaders: those who 
speak for minorities and those who speak for the central government. 
A second problem in this literature is a version of parallel play. Thus, there is a 
considerable literature on all the issues related to the demands for and the establishment 
of autonomy, yet a quite separate literature that explores questions related to secession 
(compare, for example, Karklins, 1999; Kaufman, 2001; Csergo, 2007; Buchanan, 2004). 
There is little recognition, therefore, that both of these options are connected to one 
another—in the sense that they address the same overarching question of the political 
management of diversity and majority-minority relations, and in the sense that they are 
located, albeit in different places, along the same continuum of choice running from full 
support of the status quo to full rejection of the status quo.  
Indeed, it is striking that most work on minority demands on the state has tended 
to privilege one option: secession. This is a problem in part because secessionist demands 
are in fact exceptional. Thus, like the work on revolutions, so the work on secession has 
tended to generate more theories than cases. In addition, secessionist demands are usually 
preceded by more moderate demands that for a variety of reasons have escalated over 
time—thereby rendering the analytical focus on secession both ahistorical and too limited 
in its temporal horizons to account for change. At the same time, the absence of variation 
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 in the dependent variable—or the types of minority leader demands on the state-- clutters 
causality (as in Kaufman, 2001). How can we generate compelling explanations of 
secession without using alternative types of demands to help us pinpoint those factors 
that are particularly critical for the development of a secessionist dynamic? 
There are some studies that have surmounted these deficiencies by comparing 
inter-ethnic cooperation versus conflict (see Evangelista, 2002; Alekseev and Troyakova, 
1999; Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Cornell, 2001c, 2002; Toft, 2003). While illuminating, 
these studies have the common problem of focusing on only two of the three dynamics 
discussed above. In doing so and often for reasons of simplifying the decision tree, they 
tend to reduce minority positions to a dichotomous choice. In practice, this means that 
they often exclude one extreme, such as the absence of demands for change; the middle 
ground of pressing for moderate change; or collapse the two into one category, 
cooperation. Moreover, some of these studies have an additional problem. In treating 
states as the unit of analysis and engaging in inter-state comparisons of minority political 
processes, they leave the mistaken impressions that: 1) there is little variance within 
states; 2) the agenda of minority leaders is stable over time, and; 3) dynamics within 
minority regions are less important than “state-level variables.” These deficiencies are 
particularly costly when the analysis focuses on states where there are multiple minorities 
and where these minorities pursue in fact different political agendas (see, for example, 
Fearon and Laitin, 2003; and for critiques of the state focus, Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 
2004; Medrano, 1995; Guibernau, 1995).  
The deficiencies in both how we have conceptualized the issue at hand and how 
we have conducted our studies together mean that we know surprisingly little of a 
systematic nature about why minority leaders behave in different ways when interacting 
with the leaders of their central governments. To develop more compelling answers to 
these questions, we need to design studies that accomplish two objectives. First, they 
need to address the “triad” of possible minority leader demands—that is, decisions that 
support the status quo, press for greater autonomy, or call for independent statehood. 
Second, they need to recognize the “triple variation” in demand contexts—that is, 
regional, state-level and temporal differences.  
 
The Design of this Study 
 
The purpose of this monograph is to take these methodological concerns into 
account and thereby build a more compelling explanation of why minority leaders choose 
particular demands over others when interacting with their states.2 In particular, I will 
compare the political demands of leaders in nine minority regions from 1989-2003 3  
                                                 
2 As noted earlier, it is critical to separate the issue of demands from reactions by the center and 
consequences for subsequent interactions, including violent conflict.  However, it is fully recognized that 
minorities have multiple leaders, especially when authoritarian regimes are in transition.  Thus, we are 
over-simplifying minority politics in this study (as will be recognized later in this monograph), and only a 
close reading of the literature on each case, as well as interviews conducted in the field, can identify who 
the dominant leader is and primary demand that is processed by the center. 
3 The dates selected for this study reflect several considerations.  First, while the focus is on post-
independence Georgia, Russia and Serbia-Montenegro, the dynamics of center-regional bargaining begin as 
the Soviet and Yugoslav states begin to unravel at the end of the 1980s.  Second, 2003 is a useful common 
endpoint, because relations between the center and the regions in both Georgia and Serbia-Montenegro 
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 located in three postcommunist states: Georgia (Abkhazia, Adjaria and southern Ossetia), 
Russia (Chechnya, Dagestan and Tatarstan) 4  and Serbia-Montenegro (Kosovo, 
Montenegro and Vojvodina).5 These three countries and these nine regions (see Figure 1) 
were selected for study for several reasons. First, these three states share a number of 
commonalities that are widely recognized as influencing the politics of majority-minority 
relations in multinational states. These include, for example, a common regime past (or 
communism, in this instance) that took a distinctive ideological and institutional position 
on cultural diversity; recent establishment as sovereign states as a result of the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (where they had all been republics); contested 
transitions from dictatorship to democracy; a majority nation; multiple minority 
communities exhibiting differences from the majority in language, religion and/or 
ethnicity; economic decline (even before internal wars, which broke out in all three states 
of interest); and nationally-differentiated incomes per capita. Most of these similarities, 
moreover, have one over-arching theme. They are widely-thought to provide an 
unusually supportive environment for the generation of secessionist political agendas 
(see, for instance, Bunce, 1999b; Gorenburg, 2003; Barany, 2002; Collier and Sambanis, 
2005a, 2005b).  
 
The Debates Over Ethnofederalism 
 
There is, in addition, a final important similarity among these three states, and one 
that allows us to enter into a larger debate among scholars and policy-makers about the 
optimal design of institutions in divided societies—whether in the absence of internal war 
or in its aftermath. Georgia, Russia and Serbia-Montenegro are all ethnofederal states 
and, before independence in 1991, had been ethonofederal republics nested within the 
ethnofederal states of either Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. 6  Ethnofederalism is a 
particular form of federalism. Thus, added to the familiar defining characteristics of 
federalism--or states that include geographically-defined political subunits, with these 
subunits enjoying certain powers, rights and forms of representation independent of the 
center, while at the same time sharing certain powers with the central government—is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
change substantially over the course of these years in response to major changes in not just governments, 
but also regimes.  In the discussion, however, I will bring in more recent developments. 
4 The regions selected for both Serbia-Montenegro and Georgia are the only ethnically-defined subunits 
within these two ethnofederations.  In the case of Russia, I selected three minority regions, each of which 
has identical administrative status in the federation and each of which represents one type of minority-state 
dynamic as detailed in the discussion that follows.  While there are many examples of “cats that didn’t 
meow” in the Russian Federation, the case of Dagestan seemed to be an unusually important one, given its 
proximity to Chechnya and its many similarities with that rebellious republic, including extraordinary 
poverty and Islamic religious identity.  Dagestan is also of interest, because it is the only case in the 
postcommunist region of a consociational polity.   
5 The analysis that follows will also bring in, where helpful for analytical purposes, a fourth case from the 
region:  Azerbaijan.  While this state shares a number of similarities with the other three, including 
ethnofederalism, it was not treated in a systematic way because it features only one minority-defined 
subunit. 
6 What we find, in short, is a long legacy of ethnofederalism that spans communism and postcommunism 
and the transition from a republic to independent statehood.  Having ethnofederal institutions in place prior 
to short-term and dramatic changes in politics, such as regime and state transition, is critical for our 
purposes, because these institutions have already set the stage in many respects for secessionist politics—as 
I will elaborate in the discussion (and see Bunce and Watts, 2005). 
 6
 national principle underlying some or all of the geographically-demarcated subunits 
comprising the state (and see Moreno, 2001). Thus, on the one hand, the logic behind 
ethnofederalism is the same as federalism; that is, a spatial division of the state that 
enables political subunits to exercise some of their own powers and, in the process, to 
enhance the quality of democracy by reducing the distance between government and 
citizens, lowering the ratio between representatives and citizenry, and limiting the powers 
of the center. However, ethnofederalism adds the argument that at least some of the 
subunits exist for the purpose of representing and empowering specific cultural 
communities. Ethnofederation, therefore, guarantees that some cultural communities 
sharing the same state will have at their disposal both geographical and institutional 
platforms for the expression of their interests and the exercise of political power (see, 
especially, Brubaker, 1996; Bunce, 1999b; Beissinger, 2002; Roeder, 2006; Roeder and 
Rothchild, 2005). In this sense, ethnofederalism is not just a type of federalism; it is also 
a type of power-sharing for divided societies, with the similar argument that political 
institutions must carry some guarantees of representation of cultural groups. Unlike the 
more familiar version, or consociationalism, however, ethnofederalism is a form of 
power-sharing that is geographical and vertical, rather than positional and horizontal (on 
these distinctions, see especially Roeder and Rothchild, 2005).  
But why is ethnofederalism such an important factor to address in a study of 
minority interactions with the state? The answer leads to a contradiction that nonetheless 
highlights the importance of this institutional consideration. On the one hand, there is 
widespread agreement among both policy-makers and political scientists that a critical, if 
not the critical, factor shaping politics in multinational states (whether democracies, 
dictatorships or hybrid regimes, or whether relatively stable polities or polities emerging 
from war) is the institutional design of the state. While this can mean attention to both 
constitutions and electoral systems, this primarily refers to an overarching choice 
between a unitary state versus various forms of power-sharing and the consequences of 
that fundamental choice for relations among nations co-habiting the same state (see, for 
example, Bunce, 2006a, 2005, 2004b, 1999b; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; Anderson, 
2001; but see Vujacic, 2004). This seeming consensus about the importance of state 
design, however, obscures a fundamental divide. For some analysts, political leaders of 
divided societies and for most of the international community, the common argument is 
that power-sharing arrangements, including ethnofederation, promotes inter-group 
cooperation and political stability by legitimating and empowering cultural differences 
(Bajpai, 1997; Lijphart, 1996). However, there is growing evidence that the opposite is in 
fact the case. Ethnofederalism seems to generate a number of costs, including segmenting 
nations; kindling distrust among them; encouraging corruption; escalating tensions; and, 
more generally, producing unstable regimes that often fail to reproduce themselves over 
time (see, for example, Horowitz, 1985; Bunce, 2006a, 2005, 2004b, 1999b; Roeder and 
Rothchild, 2005; Roeder, 2006; Varshney, 2001, 2002; Gorenburg, 2003; Croissant, 
1998; Petersen, 2001; Amelin, 2001; Cornell, 2001a, 2001c, 2002; Barany, 2002; Csergo, 
2006; Melvin, 2000; ICG, 2001).7 As evidence, these analysts note that, just as the long-
term costs of ethnofederalism are widely viewed as key reasons why the Yugoslav, 
Soviet and Czechoslovak states dissolved from 1991-1992, so ethnofederal states after 
                                                 
7 There are also differences of opinion regarding the economic costs and benefits of federal systems (see 
Weingast, 1998; Aslund, 1999). 
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 communism seem to feature more problems with stability, inter-ethnic cooperation, and 
democratization than their unitary counterparts—even when the two sets of states are 
similar with respect to diversity, the age of the state, a history of inter-group conflict, and 
the like (see Bunce, 1999b; Bunce and Watts, 2005).  
Thus, to explore variations in minority politics in ethnofederal states is to go to 
the heart of a heated debate over the costs and benefits of what Philip Roeder (2006; 
Roeder and Rothchild, 2005) has termed “segmented institutions” for multinational 
states. It is also to move the debate away from some broad-based and bipolar 
generalizations—for example, that ethnofederalism is either desirable or disastrous—to 
more nuanced understandings—for example, the conditions under which ethnofederalism 
has lower or higher costs. Indeed, the postcommunist world is an ideal place to explore 
these questions, given, for example, its unusually long history with ethnofederalism (the 
Bolsheviks, for example, were largely responsible for inventing this form of state in the 
1920s); the cultural diversity of many of the region’s states (excepting, for example, 




The three states analyzed in this study and their nine regions also provide us with 
some important contrasts—again in areas that are deemed important for minority political 
behavior. For example, the Russians are more dominant in percentage terms than either 
the Georgians or especially the Serbs in their respective states; both Russia and Serbia, 
but not Georgia, served as the center of the old federations (though this was expressed in 
different institutional ways) and functioned, therefore, as the obvious target of nationalist 
mobilization as the state dissolved; and the Georgian opposition, far more than either 
their Serbian or Russian counterparts, mounted a large and sustained nationalist challenge 
to the old communist state. Just as important for analytical purposes are the variations 
among minority regions. Thus, the nine regions diverge from one another with respect to 
the size and geographical concentration of the titular nation; location within the state and 
the presence or absence of a diaspora community; their language, religion, and/or 
ethnicity as compared to the majority; economic development relative to the state 
average; and historical experiences, such as prior statehood and patterns of cooperation 
and conflict with the center (see, for example, Bunce, 1999b; Toft, 2003; Barany, 2002; 
Horowitz, 1985). The cases selected for this study, therefore, whether with reference to 
states or their federal units, allow us to assess in relatively rigorous fashion how a variety 
of variables affect bargaining dynamics. 
This is particularly the case, given significant variation in the dependent variable: 
the preferences of regional political leaders. 8  Various studies of these countries and 
                                                 
8 I am assuming here that the key issue is the preferences of minority leaders, not their followers. As a 
number of studies have suggested, it is not just that bargaining between the state and minority regions is 
between the leaders of each side (see, for example, Bunce, 1999b; Hechter, 1992), but also that what 
minority leaders demand—and how states respond--has far more to do with elite concerns about power, 
money and policy than with either their reading of what their followers and allies want or any commitment 
they might voice about representing their constituencies. Moreover, in at least some cases, the assumption 
that, because there are nationalist leaders, there must be a nationalist movement, can be misguided—an 
observation that reminds us once again of the importance of leaders, rather than “followers” (see Gagnon, 
2005).  
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 regions, together with forty interviews conducted by the author in both Serbia and 
Georgia in 2005, reveal examples of each of three types of minority leader preferences 
discussed earlier in this monograph.9 Thus, we find a number of examples of acceptance 
of prevailing political practices—which I term status quo politics. There are many 
reasons why this position materializes. It can reflect, for example, either satisfaction with 
existing arrangements or the absence of opportunities for change (see Jenne, 2006 on the 
latter in particular). Thus, local leaders can derive important benefits from cooperating 
with the center, especially when politics becomes more competitive, or highly repressive 
states can block both popular mobilization and empowerment of more radical local 
leaders. What can also prevent local challenges is a united center that offers limited room 
(or allies) for political maneuver in the regions, or the absence of international support for 
significant challenges to the status quo.  
Less variable, however, are the consequences of cooperation. A status quo 
position is associated with peaceful relations between the center and the region. In this 
study, the status quo scenario captures regional-center dynamics in Dagestan throughout 
the entire period under study; Montenegro (1989-1997); and Vojvodina (1989-2000) (on 
these cases, see Chenciner, 1997; Devic, 2001; Jenne, 2003, 2006; Kisriev, 2000; 
Kerchov, et.al., 1990; “The Situation,” 2000; Walker, 2001; Ware and Kisriev, 1999, 
2001; Ware, et.al, 2003; Aliev and Jusopova, 2000). 10
A second situation is where regional leaders demand significant changes, while 
nonetheless accepting the existing borders of the state. These changes can include the 
establishment of greater economic, political and economic autonomy, and they can 
include (though this was less evident in the postcommunist cases, excepting Montenegro 
1997-2003) increased representation of the titular nation at the center of the state. In our 
cases, these demands had a common consequence: relatively tense bargaining that 
threatened at times to escalate into the much more radical proposition of local 
sovereignty (but with sovereignty defined in ways that fell short, nonetheless, of a call for 
independence). I term this dynamic reform, because in every case there were demands for 
modest and sometime significant changes, but within the parameters of existing state 
borders. The cases that fit this characterization include Adjaria,11 Montenegro (1997-
                                                 
9 In the cases of interest in this study, the preferences of minority leaders seem to produce rather predictable 
political dynamics between the center and the regions.  Thus, the status quo option produces cooperation; a 
reformist agenda produces compromise; and secessionist demands produce (less surprisingly) violent 
conflict.   
10 The placement of Vojvodina from 1992-2000 in this category is somewhat debatable, since on can 
discern from 1990-1993 growing political support for increased regional autonomy (Jenne, 2003, 2006).  
However, in contrast to Jenne, I read the demands during this period (as opposed to what developed, 
beginning in 2000) as largely concerned with restoring the autonomy that had been in place from 1974 to 
the Serbian Party leadership takeover of Vojvodina in 1999.  I do not see these demands, therefore, as 
either unprecedented or involving significant changes (see Devic, 2001).  In addition, I see significantly 
greater continuity than does Jenne in the constraints on politics in Vojvodina from 1992 through the fall, 
2000. 
11 In 2004, Adjaria was successfully reincorporated into the Georgian state—a development that reflected 
the fall from power of Shevardnadze and the victory of the liberal opposition in 2003, coupled with the 
subsequent willingness of Adjarians to mobilize against their long-serving and authoritarian regional leader 
(who had enjoyed the support of Shevardnadze, particularly as his power weakened and he needed allies).  
However, the terms of reintegration did not allow for virtually any regional autonomy.  This sent a warning 
signal to the leaders of the two remaining culturally-defined regions of Georgia, where leaders had adopted 
a far more radical stance from the beginning and where wars, as a result, had been fought during the 
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 2002), Vojvodina (2000-2003) and Tatarstan (see Guiliano, 2000; Graney, 1998, 1999; 
Kaplan, 1998; Isaev, 1998; Sagitova, 2001; Kondrashov, 2000; Derluguian, 1998, 2001c; 
Suny, 1999a, 1999b; Cerovic, 2001; Simic, 1997; “Politicheskii landshaft, “ 1996; 
Roeder, 2006; Jenne, 2006).  
The final alternative is secession. This is where local minority leaders demand 
that the state give up their subunit, with the goal of either forming an independent state or 
joining a neighboring state (as with Kosovo and Albania at certain points and Nagorno-
Karabagh and Armenia for a considerably longer period of time). In every one of these 
cases, not surprisingly, the result was a war between the center and forces representing 
the minority region. Until very recently, all of these situations led to a similar result: 
frozen conflicts that left these regions positioned between juridical independence and 
reintegration with the state (Lynch, 2004; King, 2001). Their limbo status reflected two 
developments. One was the unwillingness of the international community, in these 
situations as well as in most others since World War II, to recognize new states formed 
from popular rebellion (see Marshall and Gurr, 2003: 29). At the same time, their 
ambiguous status served the interests of not just regional leaders, but also some other 
actors as well. Thus, leaders of neighboring states and central-level leaders of the state in 
question colluded with regional leaders to exploit the opportunities for personal 
enrichment presented by porous boundaries and political and economic segmentation 
(King, 2001).12 The secession cases13 in this study include Abkhazia, Chechnya, Kosovo 
and southern Ossetia, together with Nagorno-Karabagh in Azerbaijan (see Billingsley, 
1997; Cornell, 2001 a,b,c; King, 2001a; Chrvonaya, 1994; Suny, 1999a, 1999b, 1994; 
Stefes, 2002; Lieven, 2000, 2001; Dale, 1993, 1996; Derluguian, 2001a, 2001b; Dunlop, 
1998; Garb, 1998; Goltz, 2001; Jones, 1997; Fuller and Parish, 1997; Lapidus, 1998, 
1999; Lieven, 1998; Evangelista, 2002; Croissant, 1998; Musabekov, 2001; Papazian, 
2001; Saroyan, 1990, 1999; Duijzings, 2000; Judah, 2000; Pula, 2001; Gagnon, 2001, 
2005; Malcolm, 1998; Prifti, 1999; Ula, 2001; Rupnik, 2000; Vickers, 1998; Poulton and 
Vickers, 1997; Kosovo’s Final Status, 2002).14  
Our three-fold distinction among minority leader’s demands on the state is 
summarized in Table 1. Two important implications can be quickly drawn. First, these 
                                                                                                                                                 
transition to Georgian statehood.  Moreover, considerable Russian involvement in both Abkhazia and 
southern Ossetia—for example, the distribution of Russian passports, financial assistance, and even in 
southern Ossetia the prominence of Russian Ossets in powerful political positions in that region--has also 
made their reintegration into Georgia far more difficult  At the same time, the Saakashvili regime is facing 
increasing demands for greater autonomy from the Armenian minority in Georgia.   
12 This dynamic—of purported enemies cooperating for purposes of rentseeking—is hardly unique to these 
cases.  This is precisely what happened with Milosevic and Tudjman during the first half of the 1990s, 
when they cooperated with one another to carve up Bosnia. 
13 Because this study ends in 2003, the shift to secessionist demands in Montenegro (at least by 
Djukanovic) will not be addressed in this study.  However, it is important to recognize that the divisions in 
this republic over the question of independent were clear even in the May, 2006 referendum.  Only fifty-
four percent of the voters supported independence. 
14 Kosovo presents more variation than the other cases.  One can detect, for example, a more moderate 
period from 1993-1997 (Jenne, 2003).  However, my reading is that Serbian repression, which was 
particularly marked from 1993-1997, masked what was widespread and growing support for 
independence—support which had begun to develop in the early 1980s. Here, I have been influenced by the 
analysis of Besnik Pula (2001) and by developments in Kosovo following Tito’s death and prior the 
dissolution of the Yugoslav state. 
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 distinctions provide greater precision to the question at hand. The goal of this study is to 
account for status quo, reformist and secessionist demands. Second, these three options 
can be arrayed on a scale from less to more; that is, from no demands for change in 
minority relations with the state to moderate demands to the extreme position of 
contesting state borders.15.The ordinal nature of these categories is analytically useful, 
because it makes explanation both more difficult and more subtle. It is more difficult, 
because we cannot follow the common practice in comparative case analysis of locating 
causality in the presence or absence of certain factors. It is more subtle, because ordinal 
outcomes are best explained by variables that can also be expressed in an ordinal way; 




 What factors might account for variations in minority leader preferences? We can 
begin to answer this question by dividing the literature on minority politics into three 
explanatory families. The first targets characteristics of the state, the regime and the 
majority nation. Here, it can be suggested that certain kinds of state settings are more 
supportive of the development of secessionist minorities—for example, states that are 
ethnofederal, new, and weak; that have thin dominant nations that are combined with 
large minority populations with strong identities and access to institutional resources; and 
that are mountainous and therefore both more supportive of distinctive minority identities 
and more difficult for the center to control, whether in the present or the past (see Bunce, 
1999b; Beissinger, 2002; Roeder, 1998, 2000; Toft, 2003; Cornell, 2001a, 2001c; Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003). On the regime side, a key issue seems to be the weakening of 
authoritarian rule and the likely rise, as a consequence, of both opportunities for political 
change and political competition (Bunce, 1999b; Conversi, 1993). At the same time, 
certain characteristics of the majority nation may lay some groundwork for minority 
mobilization—such as whether the majority pursues an assimilationist agenda (which can 
be hidden in language seeming to call for a civic definition of the nation—see McGarry 
and O’Leary, 2002) and whether the majority, because of its size or other considerations, 
is insecure and therefore jealous of its powers and suspicious of minority demands for 
political change. 
 In many ways, the argument here is a variant on the security dilemma (Posen, 
1993; Lake and Rothchild, 1996; Fearon, 1998). Where majorities are mobilized, but 
insecure, their leaders tend to pursue policies with respect to minorities that are seen as 
both necessary and defensive in nature. In response, also insecure minorities can code the 
actions of the majority as both unnecessary and aggressive. Minority leaders then respond 
by engaging in behaviors that they also see as both necessary and defensive, but which 
majorities perceive as threatening. As a result, mutual insecurity leads to actions that are 
intended to be defensive and to increase security, but which have the opposite and related 
effects of appearing to the other side as aggressive actions that reduce their security. A 
spiral of conflict, therefore, is unleashed.  
                                                 
15 Just as interesting, though falling outside the parameters of this study, is another contrast that can also be 
arrayed on a continuum from less to more—in this case, from less to more conflict with the state.   
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 A second family of arguments shifts our attention from the state and its dominant 
nation 16  to characteristics of subunits and minorities. Here, there are a host of 
demographic, cultural, economic, geopolitical and historical factors. For example, it has 
been suggested that minorities will have more radical agendas, if they are large and 
geographically concentrated; if they have large diasporas in neighboring states; if they 
have strong identities, access to their own institutions and substantial representation in 
local political institutions; if they are richer or poorer than the majority (with these 
differences exacerbated by economic liberalization); and if they have a history of 
independent statehood or conflictual relations with the majority (see, for instance, 
Alekseev and Troyakova, 1999; Barany, 2002; Bunce, 1999b; Brubaker, 1996; Jenne, 
2003, 2006; Toft, 2003; Cornell, 2001a, 2001c; Beissinger, 2002; Horowitz, 1985). 
The final group of causes concentrates on short-term developments—though 
recognizing in most cases that these are joined with some long-term factors that together 
increase the likelihood of certain political scenarios. Such developments include 
outcomes of the struggle for power at the center and in the regions; whether minorities 
have lost key allies in the processes of both state dissolution and regime change; and 
whether the transition to both a (somewhat) more liberal political order and statehood has 
undermined economic performance, especially when the costs are nationally-
differentiated. Thus, it has been suggested that minorities are more likely to pursue a 
radical course when the ideological composition of coalitions governing the center 
threaten the political security of coalitions governing the regions; when minorities have 
been abandoned by their former protectors in the larger state and, at the same time, are 
supported in their projects by rhetoric and weapons provided by outside actors; and when 
the economy of the state collapses and minorities in particular suffer the consequences 
(see, for instance, Horowitz, 1994; Jenne, 2003, 2006; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Bunce, 
1999 Jenne, 2003; Hechter, 1992; Csergo, 2007; Suny, 1994, 1999a, 1999b; McGarry and 
O’Leary, 2002; Petersen, 2002; Hartzell, et.al., 2001; Robinson, 2001; Samuel, 2001; 
Gurr, 2000; Gorenburg, 1999, 2003; Fearon, 1998; Laitin, 1999a, 1999b; Chua, 2003). 
When combined, these and other arguments about the effects of short-term political and 
economic change share a common claim. With higher political stakes, malleable politics, 
insecure majorities and fearful minorities, the stage is set for radicalization of both 
minorities and majorities—and not necessarily in that sequence and certainly not in 
isolation from one another.  
Before we turn to an assessment of these alternative explanations, several 
cautionary notes are in order. First, this study is shooting at a moving target. Minority 
political dynamics are inherently complex, and extreme care needs to be taken when 
assigning minority leader preferences, especially according to specific blocks of time. 
While this study is based upon both a large number of studies of these cases and 
interviews conducted in Georgia and Serbia in 2005 with various actors involved in these 
dynamics, this analysis is nonetheless based upon making some difficult coding 
decisions. What makes these decisions all the more problematic is that we are dealing not 
just with domestic orders in flux, but also an international system in flux. Indeed, 
                                                 
16 In this study, the dominant nation is both a numerical majority and the most powerful group within the 
state.  However, these measures of dominance can diverge—for example, in states, such as Kazakhstan, 
where Kazakhs are the titular nation, but smaller in size than the Russians.  Similar tensions between size 
and political power are present in a variety of other postcolonial states in the international system. 
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 precisely for the latter reason, we terminate the study in 2003 (though bringing in more 
recent developments in the discussion). This is because, beginning in 2004, both the 
United States and the European Union broke with past practices when interacting with 
the states and regions of interest here and began to take some important steps in the 
direction of supporting—or at least tolerating--the possibility of independent states 
forming in Montenegro and Kosovo.17  
We must also be careful about attributions of causality. It is one thing to show that 
some factors are more consistently related to our dependent variable, but quite another to 
draw the conclusions that: 1) these variables “explain” minority leader demands, and; 2) 
the remaining variables, lacking this consistent linkage, are irrelevant to minority politics. 
It is likely, of course, that the key factors that emerge from well-controlled comparisons, 
such as this one, do indeed play a key role. However, at the same time, one cannot 
assume that such factors constitute a “smoking gun.” In every study, important influences 
are overlooked, whether through ignorance or difficulties in measurement; there are 
likely many roads to the development of such complex scenarios as minority leader 
demands for secession, reform and the like; and the factors that “wash out” in the 
analysis, especially given the focus on such fluid political environments, may in fact play 
important roles in some cases, but not others. For example, as we will see below, 
Abkhazia and southern Ossetia in Georgia seemed to have been influenced by a few 
factors that were also in play in our other cases. However, it is fair to say that these two 
regions were in addition influenced by some factors that “failed” to demonstrate 
consistent impact across the entire group—for example, location on the perimeter of the 
state, the proximity of these two regions to Russia and its “problem area,” the Caucasus, 
and the loss in both instances of Russian protection and favoritism, once the Soviet Union 
unraveled and Georgia moved to independent statehood. Thus, our goal in this study is 
more modest than one of either asserting causality or the elimination of a host of causes.. 
Instead, it is to identify in a very crowded theoretical field through a complex set of 
controlled comparisons a subset of factors that account in a consistent way for variations 
in what minority leaders demand from their states. 
These observations remind us that the very logic of selecting Georgia, Serbia-
Montenegro and Russia (together with references to Nagorno-Karabagh in Azerbaijan) 
was premised on two arguments—most obviously, that these cases allow us to control for 
a variety of causes, and, less obviously, that they share a number of characteristics that 
increase the likelihood that minorities will be tempted to challenge the status quo. Thus, 
controlling for such factors as territorially-concentrated minorities, who have access to 
substantial institutional resources, and political leaders who operate in an unusually fluid 
political context cannot eliminate these factors as having causal influence so much as 
help us isolate some variables that may, under these enabling conditions, either move 
minority leaders in the direction of accepting the status quo or encourage them to press 
for significant changes in the status quo.  
Here, two additional considerations must be kept in mind. As noted above, there 
are a number of recent studies that demonstrate a linkage between ethnofederalism and 
                                                 
17 Strictly speaking, however, this step goes beyond the interests of this study—which is with the rise of 
secessionist agendas, rather than the less likely consequence of successful state formation.  However, in the 
future, the formation of independent states in these two cases will provide further incentives for 
secessionist demands in other contexts.  In this sense, international support is always critical. 
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 other forms of power-sharing arrangements, on the one hand, and a pronounced tendency 
by minority leaders to escalate their demands for more autonomy from the state (see, for 
example, Brass, 1991; Roeder, 2006; Treisman, 2003; Bunce and Watts, 2005; 
Beissinger, 2002; Bunce, 1999b). This is one reason, for example, why all of the states in 
this study have had to contend with secessionist demands. This is also one reason why, 
more generally, such institutional arrangements have proven to be highly unstable, 
especially in the absence of an external guarantor—with the latter associated in turn with 
limitations on both sovereignty and democratic rule. The long history of power-sharing in 
Lebanon is a case in point (Zahar, 2005).  
At the same time, the costs associated with ethnofederalism appear to be most 
pronounced when the transitions to independent statehood and/or democracy take place 
within a well-ensconced ethnofederal political context. It is precisely this combination of 
ethnofederal legacies and simultaneous transitions to both new regimes and states that 
differentiate, for example, the cases of Georgia, Serbia-Montenegro, Russia and 
Azerbaijan from two other ethnofederations that made seemingly similar transitions, but 
with different outcomes; that is, Spain and India. In Spain, the sequence was a long-
established unitary state that became in the mid-1970s the site for a transition from 
dictatorship to democracy—a transition that subsequently led to some important political 
innovations, such as regional autonomies. In India, the transition to both independence 
and democratic transition took place simultaneously, as in the postcommunist cases, but 
in the different context (as in Spain) of a unitary institutional structure. Once the dual 
transition had progressed in India, however, a decision was made by Nehru and his allies 
to introduce linguistically-defined ethnofederation of the Indian state.  
In both cases, therefore, the key point is that ethnofederation followed, rather than 
preceded the transitions to statehood and/or democracy. This is a sequence that invested 
in democratization and, in the case of India, state-building as well. This is because, in 
contrast to Georgia, Serbia-Montenegro, Russia and Azerbaijan, the struggle for 
democracy in India and Spain and for a sovereign state in India as well was far less 
segmented along national and regional lines; because reforms in the institutional structure 
of the state were crafted in ways that made autonomy conditional, among other things, on 
“good cases” for autonomy and clear commitment to both the state and a civic definition 
of the nation; and because both minorities and their leaders could argue that their 
situation improved over the past with respect to not just living within a democratic order, 
but also gaining in the process expanded legitimacy, autonomy and empowerment with 
respect to their cultural community in particular. By contrast, in our postcommunist 
ethnofederations, precisely the opposition situation played out. For example, 
ethnofederation segmented political projects and political alliances during the transition 
to democracy and statehood; sensitized many groups to the possibility of losing, rather 
than gaining legitimacy and power; and created both the resources and the incentives for 
some minority leaders at least to challenge both the new regime and state. Thus, 
ethnofederalism is particularly costly when it serves as the point of departure for the rise 






 State-Level Similarities and Differences 
 
With these considerations serving as a backdrop, let us now turn to the results of 
our comparison. On Table 2, I have provided a summary of plausible causal factors 
related to the first group of explanations; that is, those that highlight characteristics of the 
state and their dominant nations. Because of variations in minority preferences and 
minority-state bargaining both over time and within our three states, however, these 
factors are too fixed in character to provide much leverage with respect to explaining 
variations in minority leader demands on the state. That obvious point recognized, 
however, it is still useful to work briefly through these factors, if for no other reason than 
their centrality in many studies of both nationalism and secession. 
As Table 2 indicates, the first eight factors are common to Georgia, Russia and 
Serbia-Montenegro, whereas the remaining factors listed on this table differentiate among 
these states. In all cases, however, the conclusion is the same. Whether we look at 
commonalities, such as regime transition, territorially compact minorities, and regional 
variation in income, or at differences, such as the existence of a majority nation’s 
diaspora, the size and religion of the majority, the timing of nationalist mobilization, or 
an historical precedent of statehood, they fail to provide many insights into what we want 
to know: why minority leaders put forward different demands on the state. Just as striking 
is the seeming unimportance of a factor absent from Table 2. Russia is the only country 
in the postcommunist region that emerged from communism and from a larger state with 
an inclusive definition of citizenship in its constitution. This reflects, in part, the absence 
during the Gorbachev and Yel’tsin eras of an aggressive and assimilationist nationalism 
in Russia—in direct contrast, for example, to the nationalist tenor of Georgian politics 
from the second half of the 1980s (and even earlier, when circumstances permitted) 
through the mid-1990s (see Brudny, 1998, 2001 and Tishkov and Olcott, 1999; Vujacic, 
1996, 2001 on the Russian case). However, this has not freed the Russian central 
government from combative (literally) relations with Chechnya, beginning with the first 
war launched by Russia in 1994. However, it is nonetheless interesting to note in passing 
that a much larger percentage of Russia’s minority-defined regions have been cooperative 
with the center and that, after the turbulent politics of the first half of the 1990s and the 
evident weakening of the Russian state during that entire decade, Moscow’s relations 
with its eighty-seven “subjects” has tended to improve somewhat over time—though this 
may reflect the signals provided by two wars in Chechnya and Putin’s centralization of 
power and the reduced room, as a result, for local maneuver within the Russian 
Federation (see Lysenko, 1998; Koslov, 1998; Lanina and Chirikova, 1999; Fish, 2005; 
but see Stoner-Weiss, 2006).  
Let us now turn to a more likely set of candidates: important characteristics of the 
subunits. Once again, however, a number of plausible explanations fail to help us 
differentiate in a consistent way among the dynamics represented in this study. 
 
Demographic, Economic and Cultural Perspectives 
 
 In Tables 3 and 4, I compare the regions of interest according to a variety of 
variables. Let us turn, first, to demographic considerations (Table 3). If the relative size 
of the minority within the subunit were critical, with the assumption that larger minorities 
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 are more likely to rebel than smaller ones, then we should see similar scenarios for 
Vojvodina and Abkhazia—two republics in Serbia-Montenegro and Georgia, 
respectively, where the titular nation is in fact unusually small (less than twenty percent 
of the subunit’s population at the time of transition) in comparison with the other 
republics in our group, and, just as importantly, where the largest nation within the 
republic is the majority nation of the state (with Serbs an absolute majority within 
Vojvodina and Georgians, until the war, comprising nearly a majority in Abkhazia). 
However, Vojvodina is an example of status quo politics (though it moves eventually into 
the reform camp), whereas Abkhazia is an example of secession—from the beginning of 
our analysis to its end (and continuing after the fall of Shevardnadze, in part because of 
Russian support, including the provision of Russian passports to residents within 
Abkhazia, as well as southern Ossetia). Despite their similarities with respect to size, 
however, these two regions occupy nonetheless the opposite ends of the bargaining 
continuum.  
However, before we dismiss this factor, we need to look at the opposite situation; 
that is, where the titular nation is an easy majority. Here, we find three of our four 
conflict cases; that is, Kosovo (where Albanians constituted approximately eighty percent 
of the population prior to the 1991-1995 wars of Yugoslav dissolution), Chechnya (where 
Chechens comprised seventy percent of the population—a situation that is quite unusual 
for the ethnically-defined Russian republics, regions and oblasts), and southern Ossetia 
(where Ossets have constituted approximately sixty-six percent of the population). In 
addition, this pattern is repeated in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan, 
where Armenians comprised about seventy-five percent of the population before the 
outbreak of war. Finally, it is interesting to note, especially in view of limited regional 
challenges to the Russian institutional status quo, that virtually all of the minority-defined 
republics and oblasts in the Russian Federation—with the glaring exception of 
Chechnya—feature in fact titular minorities that comprise a minority of the subunit’s 
populations. This unusual pattern is testimony, among other things, to the use of 
boundaries during Soviet rule to enhance Russian domination in the Soviet heartland by 
giving the appearance, not the reality of minority empowerment; by fragmenting larger 
minority communities; and, more generally, by multiplying the number of subunits and 
thereby making coalitions among them harder to forge.  
At the very least, then, it can be suggested that, while minority size does not 
guarantee conflict (as Abkhazia reminds us) and while it is, arguably, misplaced 
arrogance for social scientists to use the term, “guarantee,” large titular minorities may in 
fact increase the likelihood of secessionist politics. For this to happen, however, it would 
seem to be helpful for other factors to be added to the equation. These can include, for 
example, increased insecurity on the part of both minorities and majorities in the context 
of regime and state transitions, and the absence of international pressures on majorities to 
be more inclusive in their politics. 18  Also important is ethnofederalism. Here, it is 
interesting to bring in another set of cases from the postcommunist region: Estonia and 
                                                 
18 Here, it is interesting to note that the titular nations of both Adjaria and Montenegro dominate their 
republics in numerical terms, and that their leaders did become more radical in their goals over time.  
However, both of these cases are distinctive in featuring unusually small cultural differences between 
titular minorities and the state’s majority population.  Thus, many Montenegrins consider themselves 
Serbian, just as most Adjars identify as Georgians. 
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 Latvia. In both of these states, the Russian minority is quite large and, in the early years 
of the transition to democracy and statehood, was often resentful of discriminatory 
citizenship policies and economic opportunities. However, pressures from the European 
Union—which were unusually influential, given the perceived benefits for Latvia and 
Estonia of accession to the EU--nudged laws about citizenship in a more egalitarian 
direction and, more generally, invested in more cooperative relations between titular 
nations and the Russian minority (see Bunce and Watts, 2005; Vachudova, 2005).  
Perhaps the most striking finding on Table 3 (column 2), however, is that 
economic differences fail to have any clear relationship with minority leader 
preferences—an argument which would also hold, if we were to add to the factors listed 
on Table 3 the impact of economic reforms (as suggested by Chua, 2003) and regional 
differences in the impact of economic decline (with economic decline, we must 
remember, a constant for all our states).. It has been argued, on the one hand, that richer 
republics or regions are more likely to defect from the state—largely because they have 
subsidized other units within the state and because they are well-positioned to construct a 
viable state. On the other hand, it has been suggested that poorer areas attribute their 
condition to exploitation and, at the very least, have a longstanding set of grievances 
against the center (see Horowitz, 1985, 1994; Medrano, 1995; and Jenne, 2003 on both 
perspectives). However, the economic development of the republic relative to the state as 
a whole does not predict behavior in our cases. For example, to focus on the conflict 
dyads, Chechnya and Kosovo are unusually poor, whereas Abkhazia and southern 
Ossetia, by the standards of their states, are unusually rich. Similarly, in the “reformist” 
camp, Tatarstan and Adjaria are above their state average, whereas Montenegro is 
somewhat below the state average. Finally, even within the category of supporting the 
status quo we find economic extremes. While Vojvodina is the richest part of Serbia-
Montenegro, Dagestan is (along with Chechnya) the poorest republic within the Russian 
Federation.  
 The failure of economic factors to shed some light on our patterns, however, is 
not so surprising. One problem is that economic factors may work in different ways in 
different places—as the competing theories about economic influence imply. Moreover, 
we must remember that, while economic factors figure prominently in both theories of 
minority politics and majority-minority relations, as well as studies of individual cases, 
they seem to fare less well in both quantitative studies and in more controlled, multiple 
case comparisons (compare, for example, Chua, 2003; Herring, 2001 versus Ballentine 
and Sherman, 2003; Collier and Sambanis, 2005a; Roeder, 2006). Indeed, economic 
considerations were not very helpful in explaining, for example, inter-republican 
variations in the nationalist mobilizations that led to the dissolution of the Soviet, 
Yugoslav and Czechoslovak states from the mid-1980s to 1992 (Bunce, 1999b; 
Beissinger, 2002; but see Youngs, 2004 on other cases).  
A variety of cultural and geographical arguments (represented in columns 3-7 on 
Table 3) also seem limited in their differentiating power—in particular, cultural cleavages 
between the majority and the minority with respect to language, ethnicity and religion; 
whether the minority has a significant diaspora population; and whether the minority is a 
majority in a neighboring state (Brubaker, 1996; Laitin, 1999a, 1999b; Lake and 
Rothchild, 1998). For example, the titular nation in both Kosovo and Tatarstan (as in 
Abkhazia, Chechnya, Dagestan, and Vojvodina) is different from the state’s majority 
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 nation in language and religion, yet secession emerges in the first case and reform in the 
second. Moreover, the remaining cases exhibit no clear pattern. In southern Ossetia, the 
key distinction is language; in Adjaria it is religion; and in Montenegro it is neither 
language nor religion--though under the banner of autonomy, Montenegro did recently 
establish its southwestern dialect of Serbian as the official language and re-establish a 
Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which had been eliminated in 1920 in deference to the 
Serbian Orthodox Church.  
At the same time, while southern Ossetia, Kosovo and Chechnya (all secessionist 
cases) have significant diasporas outside the republic, as does Nagorno-Karabakh, the 
same is also the case for Dagestan—an example of status quo politics-- and even more so 
for Tatarstan—an example of reform throughout the entire period of this study. In fact, in 
the final case the diaspora is unusually large. Tatars are the largest minority within 
Russia; only twenty-five percent of all Tatars live in Tatarstan; and, even more striking, 
more than a million Tatars (more than in Tatarstan) reside in neighboring Bashkortostan, 
where they significantly outnumber the titular nation, the Bashkirs. Finally, 
representation as a majority in a neighboring state or republic within that neighboring 
state does not help us differentiate between the cases of Kosovo (Albania) and southern 
Ossetia (northern Ossetia in Russia) versus Vojvodina (Hungary). Thus, just as with the 
demographic and economic variables, so the cultural variables are not particularly helpful 
in differentiating among our three types of minority leader preferences. 
 
Geopolitical and Historical Considerations 
 
 It has been argued that regions are far more likely to secede when they are located 
on the periphery of the state (see column 1 on Table 4). This is a common observation, 
for example, in comparative studies of the Russian Federation (see, especially, the 
analyses in Alexseev, 1999; Graney, 1998; McAuley, 1997). What is striking about our 
cases, however, is that, while all five secessionist regions (bringing Nagorno-Karabagh 
into the picture) are located on the borders of the state (though with corridors in many 
cases populated by either the majority, or, as with Nagorno-Karabakh, another minority, 
the Kurds), the same is also true of an additional four cases. Tatarstan is the only example 
in our group of a minority-defined region that is fully enclosed by the state—a factor that 
no doubt helped temper some demands in this specific case, but that lacks broader 
applicability. However, what is puzzling about Tatarstan, given its location, is how 
radical Shaimiev’s demands were (bordering, for example, on secession, given his talk of 
“sovereignty”) and how successful he was in bargaining with Moscow and carving out 
significant autonomy for his region (Roeder, 2006).  
On Table 4, I have also assessed several historical factors, predating the state 
socialist period, that might explain the differences among our cases (though if they do, 
they open up the problem of how such factors managed to be influential over long 
periods of time). The first variable (column 2) is whether the region’s incorporation into 
the state was violent or peaceful. In our cases, there are only two peaceful examples—
Vojvodina and Montenegro. By contrast, all the remaining regions were violent—though 
both Kosovo and especially Chechnya were unusually so, with resistance continuing on 
and off through both the pre-communist and communist eras. In column 3 on Table 1, I 
compare the timing of incorporation into the state. Here, the extremes are represented by 
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 Montenegro, which joined also independent Serbia in forming, along with some imperial 
remnants of both the Habsburg and the Ottoman empires, the Yugoslav state at the end of 
World War I and, second, Tatarstan, which has been part of Russia for hundreds of years. 
Both of these cases are examples of the reform scenario.  
Yet another factor highlighted on Table 4 is whether the republic was once a 
state—an argument that has been used to explain, for instance, the early appearance of 
Baltic protests during the Gorbachev period and the strong commitment of the Baltic 
peoples to independent statehood. The problem here is that there are only two examples 
of independent statehood in our group: Tatarstan (albeit before the Western concept of 
the state made its appearance and with such different boundaries that the state legacy 
claim is weak) and Montenegro. What is puzzling about this pattern is that statehood 
should, in theory, predict secession, not reformist, let alone status quo politics. However, 
it is also important to recognize that by 2004, key parts of the Montenegrin political 
leadership (though in the absence of easy majoritarian support by Montenegrin citizens) 
embraced a secessionist position. Their stance, however, may reflect far more growing 
competition for power within the republic; the momentum in support of secession that 
grew as a result of earlier support for such a position on the part of the West; and the 
institutional logic of an independent Montenegro. After all, Montenegro is the only 
“region” in our group of nine (or ten, if we add Nagorno-Karabagh) that had been a full-
fledged republic during the communist era, rather than a subunit within a republic. In this 
sense, until the pivotal referendum in May, 2006, Montenegro could be characterized as 
the final republican holdout to the dissolution of the Yugoslav, Soviet and Czechoslovak 
states into their republican parts from 1991-1992.  
 
Historical Factors During the Socialist Era 
 
It is far easier to construct a line of explanation for variations in minority leader 
demands on the state, if we focus on more recent historical developments—in our case, 
political developments during the communist period. Here, four factors emerge as 
plausible ways to distinguish among our cases. One is whether the center was allied with 
the subunit against the republic, with the result that any weakening of the center and any 
strengthening of the republic would be viewed as threatening by the subunit (see column 
4 on Table 4). This dynamic, plus an aggressive nationalism on the part of the dominant 
nation, has been analyzed as a problem of credible commitment (see Fearon, 1998). This 
argument seems to have some explanatory power in the case of the Yugoslav dissolution 
and in two of the cases of concern here—Georgia and Serbia-Montenegro. For example, 
it is evident that during the Soviet period, Moscow, ever-concerned about Georgian 
nationalism, allied with Abkhazia and southern Ossetia against Georgia. At the same 
time, while Tito was alive, unrest in Kosovo, while suppressed militarily (though less 
violently than was the case after Tito died) was followed by expanded cultural rights, 
educational opportunities, economic subsidies and Albanian representation in political 
posts. Many members of the Serbian political leadership considered this threatening, 
which in some ways was precisely Tito’s goal, not just when introducing these policies, 
but also in fashioning the 1974 Constitution, which enhanced the power of Kosovo close 
to the level of a republic, as opposed to a province. Indeed, Tito had also used other 
pretexts, such as the rise of Croatian nationalism in the early 1970s, to discipline the 
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 Serbs and thereby limit their power as the largest of the Yugoslav nations and as the 
group most over-represented in the officer corps of the Yugoslav National Army and the 
Secret Police. 
When Tito died in 1980 and later in the decade, when both the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia began to unravel, these regions lost their protector—while gaining an enemy, 
or Serbia and Georgia, respectively. Many Serbs and Georgians were resentful, given the 
perception that their nation had been discriminated against while the minority region had 
been favored. At the same time, the leaders of these two new states, Milosevic and 
Gamsakhurdia, were quite powerful, because of statehood and because they played 
successfully to resentments among Serbian and Georgian elites and intellectuals.19  
All that said, however, this line of argument seems to be less useful for the 
Russian case. Chechnya had no protector and, indeed, resisted Moscow’s control, 
whether during Russian or Soviet imperial times. Moreover, powerful political and 
economic posts within this republic went to the Russians—even though they were a 
minority of the population. This was in sharp contrast to Abkhazia and southern Ossetia 
in particular.  
A second factor, which highlights institutional resources as well as favorable or 
unfavorable comparisons with other groups sharing the republic and later state, is where 
the subunits were located within the institutional hierarchy of the ethnofederal communist 
states (column 5 on Table 4). This is an argument that was mentioned in passing in the 
discussion above of Montenegro as a republic that moved more slowly than the others to 
independence. 
The institutional distinction prompts two related arguments. One is that nations 
without institutional status and nations with institutional status, but lower in the 
hierarchy, are less likely to demand independent statehood and will press, instead, for 
higher status and/or greater autonomy. This argument, for example, helps explain patterns 
of secession at the end of the communist era, when the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
unraveled, and, later, in the successor state of the Russian Federation (see Bunce, 1999b; 
Beissinger, 2002; Treisman, 1997; Barany, 2002). At the same time, it can be argued that 
having the highest category within the federation—for example, republican as opposed to 
provincial status within Yugoslavia—might tempt local leaders in a climate of change 
and growing insecurity to carry their autonomy one step further. This logic, once again, 
played out earlier in patterns of nationalist mobilization in the dissolution of the Soviet, 
Yugoslav and Czechoslovak states.  
If we look at the final column on Table 4, however, we do not find a clear pattern. 
All nine of our regions, of course, had institutional identity during communism—which 
suggests that such identities and institutional resources are better understood as helpful, 
but far from sufficient conditions for mobilization against the state. The rebellious 
behavior of the Russian minority in the Crimea in Ukraine and in Transniestr in Moldova 
also points to the limits of a purely institutional account—or, for that matter, a purely 
                                                 
19 The Serbian case is more complex, not just because Milosevic was a communist, whereas Gamsakhurdia 
was an intellectual defying the party, but also because Milosevic in fact represented a position mid way 
between the extremes of rejecting a nationalist agenda (as did his predecessor, mentor and eventual victim, 
Stambolic), and embracing an aggressive, if not fascist nationalist agenda (Seselj).  Moreover, the 
nationalist following of Milosevic has been exaggerated, whereas his success in demobilizing the liberal 
opposition—a key to his consolidation of political power—has been ignored (see Gagnon, 2005).  
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 domestic account. For example, it is striking how important Russian help was for 
encouraging the nationalist revolts in both the Crimea and Transniestr. Also striking is 
that, in comparison with the regions of interest in this study, the crisis in the Crimea in 
particular was surprisingly amenable to resolution—an argument that again reminds us of 
the costs of ethnofederalism for safe-guarding state boundaries (Bunce and Watts, 
2005).20  
At the same time, the propensity of minorities to rebel does not correlate with 
their position in the administrative hierarchy of the communist era. For example, 
Montenegro is the only case of a region that had republican status during the communist 
period, and Abkhazia, Vojvodina and Kosovo were all of lower status than the remaining 
subunits in our group (although how one reads both Vojvodina and Kosovo is 
complicated by how one interprets the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution).  
A related factor is whether there were changes during the communist period in 
administrative status (column 5 on Table 4). Given the importance of such status for 
cultural rights, political power and access to economic resources, all of which were 
critical for bargaining between regions, on the one hand, and the republic and the center 
before 1991 and, after that, the new state, it can be suggested that a downgrading of such 
status would correlate with subsequent mobilization against the successor state. However, 
this hypothesis does not hold. While the status of Montenegro remained constant (as did 
Nagorno-Karabakh) and the status of both Abkazia and Chechnya were downgraded 
(which prompted in both cases considerable lobbying at the center to return to the earlier 
designation), the status of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and southern Ossetia were upgraded over 
the course of communist rule. Again, the cases do not array themselves in a pattern that 
would account for variable minority leader preferences. 
Finally, there is the question of representation and power. It was commonly 
asserted by the communist party leaders of the Soviet and Yugoslav ethnofederations that 
the administrative design of the state was premised upon the commitment to promoting 
representation of minorities in important political and economic posts. However, the 
commitment to “korenizatsiia” (nativization of cadres) varied over time, across country 
and within country. For example, in the post-Stalinist era in the Soviet Union, it became 
common practice for the first secretaries of the republic to come from the titular nation. 
By contrast, following the crisis in Croatia in the early 1970s in Yugoslavia, the 
representation of Croats within the Croatian political leadership declined significantly—
to the advantage of the Serbs. The Serbs were also over-represented, as noted earlier, in 
the Secret Police and the Yugoslav National Army. Similarly, in the Soviet Union, the 
upper reaches of the party apparatus and the military were dominated by Russians.  
There are good reasons to posit that representation of the subunit’s titular nation 
in important economic and political posts during the communist era would shape the 
subsequent behavior of the subunit when both the regime and the state unraveled. One 
can imagine, in particular, two contrasting lines of argument. On the one hand, it can be 
suggested that under-representation would generate accumulated grievances, especially if 
                                                 
20 This does not mean, however, that the Crimea, with its majority Russian population, does not continue to 
pose problems for Ukrainian politics.  It was this area, in combination with the Donbas region, for example, 
that provided substantial support to Yanukovytch during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections.  In fact, 
once the official outcomes of the election were challenged, leaders of both regions were quick to hint at 
secession. 
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 the beneficiaries of this asymmetry were from the republic’s titular nation and especially 
if this asymmetry was built upon a history of long term conflict and violent incorporation 
of the area into the state. On the other hand, over-representation of the minority would 
produce resentment on the part of other nations within the subunit—a particularly 
explosive situation if those disadvantaged were from the republic’s titular nation. 
Moreover, such over-representation would have another consequence that could, 
logically, lead to conflict. The titular nation of the subunit—and its leaders in 
particular—would have substantial resources for mobilization against the republic, and 
would be very inclined to do so, if as with state dismemberment, they faced the unhappy 
prospects of losing their patron and, thus, their privileged position, while being blocked 
from upward political advancement within the new state. At risk, therefore, was a change 
in local hierarchies, the importance of which has been examined in other contexts by 
Roger Petersen (2002). 
The patterns in our data, however, do not support either set of arguments. While 
the titular nation was over-represented both politically and economically in some of our 
conflict cases (Abkhazia and southern Ossetia), it was under-represented—indeed, 
significantly so-- in others (as in Chechnya and in Kosovo, excepting improved 
representation in the latter during the second half of the 1970s). In addition, whereas in 
Dagestan and Tatarstan, representation in important economic and political posts during 
the communist era seems to have come relatively close to the ethnic distribution of the 
population, in Adjaria and Montenegro the titular nation seems to have been somewhat 
over-represented. In the case of Vojvodina, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
Hungarian minority was somewhat under-represented in politics, but over-represented in 
the economic realm. Indeed, aside from the Slovenes, the Hungarians were the richest 
ethnic group within Yugoslavia—even richer than the Croatians (see Mertus, 1999). 
 
Political Struggles During the Transition 
 
In Table 5, I have listed four factors that focus on political dynamics during the 
transition from state socialism and to independent statehood. In column one, I compare 
patterns of nationalist mobilization by the titular nation of the republic. It is striking how 
in all three of our states, the weakening of their former states was accompanied by the 
rise of nationalist elites at the republican level—a pattern that cannot be generalized for 
all the republics that made up Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is fair to argue 
that Georgian, Russian and Serbian leaders played a key role in the dissolution of these 
two states. The first secessionist constitution in Yugoslavia, for instance, was crafted not 
in Slovenia or Croatia, but, rather, in Serbia—Milosevic’s rhetorical attacks on these 
“hostile” regions and his verbal support for the Yugoslav state notwithstanding. 
However, if our interest is with explaining variation within states, the comparisons drawn 
in column one provide little purchase.  
The same can be said, moreover, if we shift our attention from the rise of majority 
nationalism in the republics to the rise of minority nationalism in the regions. It is true 
that national identities and an agenda of reducing external control over the region were 
both early developments in all of the secessionist cases. For example, in 1964 and 1965, 
the leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh sent a petition to Khrushchev and Brezhnev, 
respectively, criticizing Azerbaijani rule and requesting a merger with Armenia. 
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 However, the remaining cases of status quo and reformist demands fail to arrange 
themselves in a systematic way, once we focus on temporal patterns in the development 
of nationalist protest. 
This leads to column two on Table 5, where the focus is on the struggle for political 
power at the center when the Soviet and Yugoslav states and regimes began to dissolve. 
Here, our three states provide three alternative outcomes—continued power, until the 
watershed Serbian presidential elections of 2000, of the ex-communists in Serbia, a 
mixed case in Russia (where victorious forces included both ex-communists and the 
opposition and where the ex-communists at certain points in the 1990s and consistently 
thereafter played a central role in the Parliament and also served as President), and the 
rise to power of the nationalist, non-communists in Georgia, followed by a mixture of the 
two groups, once Shevardnadze returned to power (which has been followed, since the 
parliamentary elections of late 2003 and the presidential election of early 2004, by the 
rise to power of the Georgian liberal opposition). It is not surprising that these differences 
in struggles between nationalists, communists and various combinations of the two are 
not very helpful for our purposes. They can hardly account for the variable demands on 
the state extended by regional political leaders—though they do, it must be admitted, say 
something about why all of these ethnofederal states faced secessionist pressures during 
regime and state transition. 
In the remaining two columns on Table 5, however, we finally find some factors 
that seem to go much further in differentiating in a systematic way among our three 
bargaining trajectories. One such factor is the availability of international support for 
secessionist demands on the state (see Jenne, 2003, 2006; Laitin, 1999a; Hechter, 1992; 
Bunce and Watts, 2005). Here, we can note, for example, Russian support of Abkhaz and 
southern Ossetian secessionists (which has, if anything, increased following the fall of 
Shevardnadze in 2003); Albanian support of Kosovar Albanians (though partially 
passive, given leakage of arms across a common border, beginning in 1997), together 
with the NATO bombing campaign in 1999; support from a variety of quarters outside 
Russia for the Chechens; and, finally, Armenia’s involvement, beginning during the 
Gorbachev era in the secessionist politics of Nagorno-Karabakh and the important role as 
well of Russia in this conflict, again dating from the Gorbachev era and continuing to the 
present (and helped by the role of Armenia as the last fully obedient ally of Russia in the 
Caucasus). The role of international support can be seen most clearly, however, when we 
track changes in Montenegro.  
While Montenegro, like Vojvodina and Kosovo, was taken over by the Serbian 
party leadership on the eve of the end of Yugoslavia, groups within Montenegro—despite 
the deep cultural ties of this republic to Serbia—were nonetheless somewhat divided over 
their alliance with Serbia. Two issues were of concern—Serbia’s attacks on Bosnia and 
then Kosovo and the Serbian leadership’s resistance to economic and political reforms. In 
1997, Milo Djukanovic, an ex-communist, was elected president on a platform involving 
commitment to reform, greater political and economic autonomy from Serbia, and peace 
within the region. As a means of expanding his own power in a highly competitive 
political environment, Djukanovic reached out to the West—which was only too glad to 
respond, since Djukanovic was widely viewed as a useful ally who could possibly help 
constrain the political power of Milosevic. However, in the fall of 2000, the Serbian 
opposition finally succeeded—through votes and then massive political protests—to 
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 topple Milosevic through a well-planned electoral revolution (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006). 
Thus, the possibility of a democratic and peaceful Serbia finally materialized—a 
possibility that seemed all the more likely, given the death of Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman 
in 1999, the liberalization of Croatian politics early the following year, and the diffusion 
of electoral revolutions from Slovakia to Croatia and then to Serbia (Bunce and Wolchik, 
2006). At that point, the West changed its position, encouraging Montenegro to stay 
within the Yugoslav federation of Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo. From the West’s 
perspective, the key issue was supporting democratic developments in Serbia and 
building peace within the region—a peace that would be threatened, it was assumed, by 
weakening the Serbian government, by opening up the question of border changes 
(including Kosovo), and by creating a series of small and weak states in the Balkans (as 
opposed to the ideal of a strong Serbia and Croatia balancing each other).  
The result was an agreement in the spring, 2003, forced in effect by the European 
Union in collaboration with the United States, that created a new state—Serbia and 
Montenegro—that was considerably decentralized in both political and economic terms 
(including a separate currency for Montenegro), but that remained nonetheless—at least 
in the eyes of the international community-- a single unit.21  The parallels to the old 
Yugoslav state, of course, were both striking and distressing. However, as promised by 
the EU in the agreement reached in 2003, Montenegro was allowed to hold a referendum 
on independence three years later—which it did on May 21, 2006. The majority of voters 
supported independence. From the Serbian perspective, this was an outcome that had the 
decided benefit of finally liberating Serbia in an institutional sense to carry out in 
expeditious fashion needed political and economic reforms. However, whether 
Montenegrin democratization will survive the loss of secession as the focus for its 
domestic and international politics is another question. Moreover, Serbian 
democratization, while most likely aided by the subtraction of Montenegro, may be 
undermined in the future by the much less domestically popular decision to lose Kosovo 
as well (though there are reasons to think that the salience of this issue is exaggerated—
see, for example, Goati, 1996; Djordjevic, 2005).  
What the Montenegrin story suggests is not just that the West is fickle, depending 
upon its interests at the moment—a hardly startling observation. It is also that 
international alliances and international actions more generally can have a wide range of 
consequences. They can fuel secession and its opposite—the latter by ignoring aggressive 
behavior on the part of the center (the costs of inaction—which are often ignored by 
analysts); supporting dominant nations; or, more generally, providing verbal and other 
support for existing state borders. One example is Western policy towards Russia and the 
Chechen crisis (Evangelista, 2002). But perhaps the best example is what has happened 
to all of our secessionist regions from the late 1980s to 2003; that is, their limbo status 
and the incentives for leaders of both the majority nation and minorities to prolong this 
peculiar state of affairs and the international community either to do the same (as with 
                                                 
21 In this sense, while I have coded Montenegro as a case that moved from 
cooperation to compromise, a more detailed reading might suggest a shift to a 
secessionist dynamic, beginning in 1997.  Moreover, while war did not break out between 
Serbia and Montenegro, the outcome—or such segmented politics and economics that the 
state became largely a fiction--resembles our other conflict cases.    
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 Russia in Abkhazia, southern Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabagh) or simply to tolerate semi-
states for reasons of sovereignty, oil or fear of destabilizing regional powers (see Lynch, 
2004; King, 2001).  
International support, therefore, is quite variable and needs to be contextualized 
(Chervonnaya, 1994; Barbarosie, 2001; Lynch, 2004; Jenne, 2006). There are a number 
of international players, including the West (which is not always consensual) and 
regional powers, such as Russia, and they can use their power either to maintain or 
undermine the state. Moreover, international support, we must remember, was present not 
just in the secessionist cases, but also in Adjaria (Turkey) and Montenegro (from 1997-
2002). A closer look at these examples points us to two helpful refinements of the claim 
about the importance of external support. 
One is to focus less on the presence or absence of such support than to assess 
differences in the access of minority populations to weaponry. This was a key factor 
explaining why the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but not the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia, was violent—in particular, because of the existence of well-armed 
regional militaries and the politicization of the Yugoslav National Army (Bunce, 1999b). 
This factor has also emerged in other studies of ethnic conflict, where the key issue 
appears to be the presence of guerilla war conditions, including rough terrain and small, 
armed groups (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).22 It is striking that all of our conflict cases 
feature access to weapons, whether supplied by the Russians (as in Abkhazia and 
southern Ossetia, along with one case not analyzed here, Transdniestr in Moldova), by 
the Albanians (as in Kosovo, but not deliberately), or leakage from the Soviet military, as 
in Chechnya (including the “leakage” of one Soviet general, Dudayev, who served as a 
nationalist leader of the republic) (Barbarosie, 2001; Dunlop, 1998). By contrast, such 
access seems to have been absent in our status quo and reformist categories.  
A second amendment is to suggest that the impact of international support for 
secession can be understood as not just providing incentives for elite support for 
secession, but also as shaping both political agendas and struggles for power within 
regions by providing incentives for adoption of more radical positions and/or selection of 
more radical leaders—whether that means in the particular regional context leaders 
supporting greater autonomy (as with Vojvodina from 1990-1993, when the Forum-led 
government in Hungary flirted with the Hungarian diaspora), significant autonomy (as 
with Adjaria), or outright independence (as with Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and 
southern Ossetia). International support for minority concerns, therefore, may not 
“produce” secession; it may simply move subunit leaders in a more radical direction or 
empower more radical leaders in their competition with less radical leaders. This 
observation leads, in turn, to the final column in Table 5, where we focus on variations 
among our regions in the outcomes of struggles for power during the transitions to new 
regimes and states. As we will see, to borrow from Tip O’Neill’s (the former Speaker of 





                                                 
22 It is helpful to recognize that, while all of our conflict cases feature rough terrain, the same is also true 
for both Dagestan and Montenegro. 
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 The Local Politics of Transition 
 
 There were three kinds of political situations that developed in our minority 
regions as the Georgian, Serbia-Montenegrin and Russian republics made their transition 
to independent statehood. Indeed, these are precisely the three scenarios that summarize, 
more generally, the political trajectories taken by the twenty-seven regimes that emerged 
from communism and communist states from 1991-1992 in east-central Europe, the 
Balkans, and Eurasia (Bunce, 1999a; Bunce, 2006). One dynamic was where the 
communists were able to continue in political power, largely because movements that 
might counter them—liberal, nationalist or some combination of the two—were weak 
and divided, with both deficits reflecting opposition development during the last decades 
of the state and communism; the divisive impact on the liberal opposition of heated 
debates, particularly evident in ethnofederal contexts, about state borders, national 
identities, and the security of cultural communities; and the clever politics of some 
communist leaders when confronting a more competitive political landscape (see, for 
example, Bunce and Wolchik, 2006). In this situation, leaders of minority-defined 
regions were relatively secure, and they had few incentives, as a result, to incorporate 
either nationalist or democratic issues into their political appeals. Indeed, to have done so 
would have been to admit some political vulnerability; to empower segments of the 
opposition; and to open up the possibility of considerable intra-regional conflict (since 
most regions, we must remember, were quite heterogeneous, with significant 
representation in most of our cases of the state’s dominant nation).  
As communists, moreover, they had little personal commitment to either a 
nationalist or a liberal project (though there were, of course, reform communists 
throughout the postcommunist region who were able to transit gracefully to liberal 
values). Ideology, in short, can matter, along with interests. In addition, because of 
continuity in institutions and personnel in this scenario of “communist continuity,” these 
regional leaders also had considerable resources in place to build (or augment existing) 
political machines. Thus, regional communist leaders who were politically secure were in 
a strong position to keep both nationalists and liberals at bay.  
In the early years of the transitions from communism and communist states, this 
scenario proved to be in fact the most common one. It describes, for example, most of the 
republics that became states in the Soviet Union (Bunce, 1999a). Returning to our cases, 
the “communist continuity” dynamic summarizes developments in Dagestan, 
Montenegro (up to 1997), and Vojvodina (especially from 1993 to 2000), where the 
common stance by regional leaders was support of the status quo. What is also striking in 
these regions is the close alliance between local communists and the “new” center—for 
example, Russia and Dagestan and Serbia, on the one hand, and at various points both 
Montenegro and Vojvodina. For the center, the most important issue, whether or not 
communists were also at the helm there, was the ability of the local communists to 
maintain stability in their area of the state. This was even the case for Adjaria, where a 
local communist—perhaps best termed a despot-- confronted first a nationalist leader at 
the center, then an ex-communist, and beginning in late 2003 a leader of the liberal 
opposition.23 What all this suggests is a point already made: variations in politics at the 
                                                 
23 It is telling that, of the three types of leaders who have come to power in Georgia since independence, the 
most threatening one, from the perspective of the longserving leader of Adjaria, Abashidze, was the current 
 26
 center, surprisingly enough, seemed to have been less important for subsequent 
developments in center-regional relations than patterns of political change or continuity 
in the minority regions.  
  The second variant of political struggle in the regions at the end and after state 
socialism—and the one that describes what happened in all of the reform cases—was 
where the communists confronted a strong nationalist movement, competed with them for 
power in their locality, and eventually succeeded in fending off the nationalist challenge. 
These communists, therefore, managed to dominate the local political scene during 
transition, but only after a difficult political struggle. In these contexts, the communists 
had the benefit of some continuity in local personnel and institutions. However, for 
coalitional reasons, the victorious communists had stronger incentives than the 
communists in the first scenario to embrace parts of the nationalist agenda. Thus, they 
called for regional sovereignty (often using vague language that made the center nervous, 
but local constituencies reassured), and they supported cultural, political and economic 
autonomy.  
Leaders in this political context, such as Shamiev in Tatarstan, Abashidze of 
Adjaria, and Djukanovic in Montenegro, were the proverbial communists who for 
political reasons became nationalists. This self-serving ideological transformation, 
however, was in fact the political exception, not the rule—whether we focus solely on the 
states and regions of interest in this study, or, more generally, on the politics of transition 
in the postcommunist region as a whole. In addition, for those communists who were 
willing and able in the face of credible threats to their political and economic monopoly 
to rapidly redefine their “hearts and minds,” the consequence was not always, as is 
commonly assumed, to embrace illiberal nationalism. Some communists, such as Kucan 
in Slovenia, Kwasniewski in Poland, and Horn in Hungary, moved quickly and with 
considerable popular support from being communists to being both liberal and 
nationalist. In all of these cases, however, the transition to liberalism and nationalism was 
facilitated by the reformist culture of their communist parties during the communist era. 
Such a culture, it is easy to forget, was also present in the Serbian party apparatus, but 
lost out to other groups over the course of the 1980s. 
The final political scenario is what happened in the secessionist cases. Here, the 
communists invariably lost to the nationalists, and the leaders of the nationalist groups, 
lacking much opposition and facing institutional and economic disarray with the collapse 
of local communist rule, were free (and perhaps forced) to pursue a radical agenda that 
focused on secession as the “solution” to the region’s considerable problems. In 
Abkhazia, southern Ossetia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya, politics from the 
beginning of the regime and state transition was unusually turbulent—a situation hardly 
helped by the availability of arms in each of these cases and the breakdown of any 
consolidated political authority within the region. Whether the nationalists or the 
                                                                                                                                                 
incumbent, Mikheil Saakashvili, who came to power on a wave of support for democratization of Georgian 
politics.  In 2004, Saakashvili was able to draw upon considerable popular support in both Georgia and 
Adjaria to end the despotic rule of Abashidze and soon thereafter reintegrate Adjaria into the Georgian 
state.  Also telling is that Adjaria ended up losing considerable autonomy in the process—even in 
comparison with its status during the communist era.  This is not an outcome on offer either to Abkhazia or 
southern Ossetia, in part because of their secessionist history, in part because of Russian support of these 
areas as a way of countering Saakashvili’s alliance with the U.S.; and in part because of the fears raised by 
the degree of recentralization that took place with respect to Adjaria. 
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 communists maintained power at the center, however, was irrelevant in how politics 
developed within these secessionist regions. What invariably transpired was an attack by 
the center on regions that were at once recalcitrant and chaotic. This attack, moreover, 
had the predictable effects of locking in two destabilizing dynamics. One was the 
privileging of both a secessionist agenda and leaders who promoted such an agenda. This 
was despite the fact that in many cases the original call for secession was little more than 
a symbolic threat meant to weaken local opponents and extract some benefits from the 
center. This was similar to what happened in the case of Slovakia, when, after the 1992 
elections, Vaclav Klaus (the leaders of the Czech Republic) called Vladimir Meciar’s 
bluff (the leader of Slovakia), and the state split into two parts (Bunce, 1999b). The other 
destabilizing dynamic locked in by aggressive actions on the part of the center was a 
conflict spiral built upon a security dilemma. As noted earlier, the problem was that 
defensive actions are interpreted as aggressive and contribute to escalation of conflict, 
when the players involved share the characteristics of being both insecure and co-
dependent. 
What emerges as critical in differentiating among our three scenarios, therefore, is 
the character of local politics when regimes and states were both in transition. This line of 
argument seems to provide us with a relatively strong explanation, because, unlike the 
role, for example, of international support and the availability of weaponry (and many 
other factors addressed in Tables 3-4), this explanation has the distinctive virtue of 
allowing us to link variations in political outcomes with variations in the extent of change 
sought by minority leaders. Just as demands on the center for change can be arrayed in 
ordinal fashion from minimal to extensive, so the outcomes of the politics of transition in 
the regions can also be arrayed in an ordinal way—from communist continuity to full-
scale defeat and from political stability to chaos. 
The relationship between minority leader demands and the character of local 
politics can be phrased in several ways. Most succinctly: the more successful the local 
nationalists were in competing with the communists, the higher the probability that 
minority leaders would demand significant changes in their region’s relationship to the 
state. This relationship, however, can be framed in another way: the greater the local 
political break with the communist past, the greater the propensity of local leaders to 
embrace a more radical agenda calling for local sovereignty. Finally, there is a third way 
of expressing the relationship this study has uncovered—a version of the argument that 
has the helpful consequence of widening in a geographical sense the applicability of this 
study. It can be argued that, when authoritarian rule weakens and a political transition 
begins, the more competitive the local arena becomes, the more predisposed minority 
leaders are to demand greater autonomy, if not independence for their regions (and see 
Roeder, 2006). Competition in the particular setting of the subunits nested within 
ethnofederal states, therefore, can be quite costly insofar as both peace and the stability of 
state borders are concerned.  
 
Explaining the Explanation 
 
As Table 5 documented and as the discussion above elaborated, there seems to be 
a systematic relationship between the variable outcomes of local political struggles 
during transition, on the one hand, and variations in the kinds of demands local leaders 
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 make on their ethnofederal states. Moreover, this relationship is all the more compelling, 
given two other considerations. One is that it survives the “ordinal test,” thereby allowing 
us to correlate issues of less and more in the independent and the dependent variables. 
The other is that the relationship makes sense from the standpoint of the interests (and 
sometimes the values) of local politicians when confronting a less secure political 
environment. 
 However, there is, nonetheless, an obvious problem with attributing so much 
explanatory power to the contrasting political trajectories of the regions. Is it not 
tautological to argue in effect that secessionist demands materialize when nationalists win 
political power in minority regions? I think not—for several reasons. First, the causal 
factor of interest here, or how local communists fared in their struggle with local 
nationalists, does not just account for secessionist scenarios; it also differentiates between 
the two remaining scenarios, or status quo versus reformist political preferences. Indeed, 
once we bring into the picture the latter two categories, we find little support for a 
tautological claim. There is no compelling reason to assume that communists winning 
easily at the local level would behave any differently than communists who had greater 
difficulty defeating the nationalists. For example, one might expect that, just as easy 
communist dominance would limit local demands on the state for change, so would a 
bare victory over the nationalists—the latter because the communists, being more 
vulnerable politically, might seek a close alliance with the center to keep local 
nationalists weak. At the same time, one would expect this calculus about appeasing the 
center versus appeasing local nationalists to vary, depending upon political outcomes at 
the center. Here, it is important to remember that the reform scenario occurs, whether the 
communists lose power at the center (as with Georgia and its relationship to Adjaria) or 
maintain that power (as with Serbia-Montenegro and its relationship to Montenegro).  
If we return to the secessionist cases, moreover, we can counter the tautological 
interpretation by bringing in another consideration that is easily overlooked. We know 
from comparative studies of nationalism and nationalist movements that nationalists do 
not by any means invariably coalesce around a radical agenda (Gorenburg, 2000, 2003; 
Bunce, 2005; Abdelal, 2001). Like all social movements, nationalist movements are loose 
coalitions among people who join for a variety of reasons, only some of which 
correspond to a nationalist motivation. Moreover, such movements form around some 
broad agreements, especially in the face of a common enemy, about certain goals, but 
who vary from one another, nonetheless, in their interests, ideologies, repertoires of 
political behavior, and preferred strategies for change. In addition, goals are quite 
changeable and highly reactive, given the behavior of the center and the hothouse of local 
politics. The victory of local nationalists, in short, does not predict necessarily—or, 
indeed, even usually-- the rise of secessionist political agendas.  
The understandable variation in the kinds of goals nationalist movements and 
leaders embrace notwithstanding, one can still argue that regional nationalists in the 
particular context of new states with a legacy of ethnofederalism would be more likely 
than most nationalists to take a radical position—which is precisely why we find the 
association in our cases between nationalist victories and secessionist politics. New states 
are nervous states. If we add to this other characteristics, such as the fact that these states 
were carved out of larger states and these states have multiple minority communities, 
with many of those communities located on the perimeters of the state and benefiting 
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 from access to substantial institutional resources and already considerable investments in 
local autonomy, we can conclude with some confidence that these states were—and 
are—unusually jealous of their territory. In addition, since political dynamics in a more 
competitive environment rarely legitimate demands for less autonomy than in the past, 
nationalist leaders in the regions in ethnofederations are more likely to go one step further 
than in the past; that is, to press for independence, rather than reform. This approach is all 
the easier to imagine, given the recent and successful precedent of such developments 
when republics moved to statehood.  
The leaders of Georgia, Serbia and Russia, therefore, found it quite easy to fear 
minority unrest, to assume that it would spread, and to use military force to demobilize 
minorities and maintain borders. Aggressive centers, in turn, laid the groundwork for 
empowering local radicals, while encouraging more generally an escalation of local 
demands. What I am suggesting here is some sensitivity to sequencing. Nationalist 
leaders in the postcommunist region often embraced a secessionist agenda in part because 
central-level leaders, themselves nationalists as well as nervous state-builders, pushed 
them in that direction—in part by weakening both the case for more modest goals and the 
constituencies supporting less radical outcomes. This is an argument, moreover, that can 
be applied not just to relations between our nine regions and the Russian, Georgian and 
Serbian states. It can also be applied to the dynamics underlying the dissolution of the 
Yugoslav, Soviet and Czechoslovak ethnofederations. 
There are some good theoretical and empirical reasons, therefore, to stick with the 
interpretations that emerged on Table 5. Differences in how local politics played out after 
the dissolution of communist states seemed to have played an important role in 
influencing whether local leaders in our nine regions supported the status quo, sought 
greater autonomy from their ethnofederal states, or took the extreme step of demanding a 
state of their own. At the same time, differences in international support for various 
regional agendas also played a role, whether the West and Russia acquiesced to 
developments in these three states or took strong stances either in support of existing 
boundaries or in support of challenges to those boundaries. Indeed, looking at the region 
after 2003, it is clear that secession can only lead to statehood if the international 
community supports that outcome. 
 
Conclusions and Implications  
 
The purpose of this monograph has been to compare minority politics in Georgia, 
Russia and Serbia-Montenegro from 1989-2003 in order to answer a fundamental 
question about minority politics within multinational states. Why do minority leaders 
vary—within country, over time and across country—in what they demand for their 
regions from their central governments? Three types of minority demands were 
compared, with the differences based upon the degree of change sought by minority 
leaders. One scenario is status quo politics. This is where minority leaders accept 
prevailing practices and where relations with the state, as a result, are unchanging. 
Another is where minorities press for significant changes, but not to the point of rejecting 
state boundaries—the reformist scenario. Finally, some minority leaders put forward a 
secessionist agenda.  
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 A number of causal factors were evaluated, including political, economic and 
cultural variables, factors that are likely to affect the central government or the regions, 
and long-term versus short-term influences on relations between the center and minority 
regions. Rather than repeat each assessment, let us divide the factors into three groups. 
The first are arguments that proved to be largely irrelevant in the sense that they seemed 
to lack any consistent relationship either to variations in minority leader demands on the 
state and even a subset of those demands. Examples here include the outcome of political 
struggles at the center and economic factors. The second are explanations that appear to 
have some explanatory power, but only in some instances. Here, we can highlight the 
tendency of leaders of large minorities to embrace secessionist agendas. Finally, several 
factors emerged as unusually helpful in differentiating among minority leader agendas: 
the positions adopted by international actors (whether engaged or acquiescent and 
whether supportive of minority leaders seeking change or of continuity in both prevailing 
institutional practices and state boundaries) and, just as important, the outcomes of 
struggles for power within the regions. Put simply: the greater the international support 
for minorities and changes in the status of their regions in the direction of less central 
control and the greater the local power of the nationalists as opposed to the communists, 
the more likely minority leaders will reject the status quo and seek significant changes in 
the autonomy, if not the independence of their region (and see Jenne, 2006 for a related 
argument). 
This explanation, in turn, leaves us with an important question, as well as a 
number of useful implications. Can we apply these arguments to other times and places, 
or are they relevant only to postcommunist ethnofederations in a time of regime change 
and state formation? To answer this question, we must confront a common dilemma in 
comparative case analysis: controlling for a number of factors helps isolate some of the 
likely causal factors at work, but the very process of looking at similar contexts may also 
limit the reach of the conclusions drawn. Thus, in constructing controlled comparisons, 
case selection can become quite unrepresentative of the world at large—even though we 
“pretend” that this is not so by controlling for some distinctive features. Does this mean, 
as a result, that the arguments that emerged in this comparative study are only relevant to 
the postcommunist region and, indeed, to ethnofederations within that region? Such a 
limitation, moreover, would seem to follow necessarily from an argument that privileges 
competition between local communists and local nationalists?. What makes this problem 
all the more acute are two other considerations—the seeming dissonance between the role 
of competition in our cases versus its more positive role in other studies that focus on 
related (albeit not identical) questions (see Wilkinson, 2004); and the dissonance as well 
between our explanation and explanations regarding variations in regime trajectories in 
the postcommunist world. In particular, it is striking that, while communists losing the 
struggle for political power is a dynamic that seems to invest in democratic politics in the 
postcommunist region, precisely the same factor at the local level seems to disinvest in 
the state.24  
There are several reasons, however, to posit the possibility that the findings 
reported here may have relevance to other political contexts. One is that, while this study 
                                                 
24 What this seems to suggest is that the key commonality is the relationship between the outcome of 
political competition and subsequent change.  Just as communists maintaining power invest in regime and 
boundary continuity, so their loss of power leads to both regime change and border challenges. 
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 has been littered (perhaps too liberally) with references to the specifics of the 
postcommunist experience, the conclusions drawn can be recast in ways that expand 
generalizability. In particular, there are a number of studies, using different methods and 
different cases, that also attribute considerable importance to the role of international 
actors, including their rhetoric and their weaponry (Jenne, 2006). Second, we can re-
frame the argument about the struggle for power between communists and nationalists—
in two ways. First, it may be that regime transition provides a very different dynamic than 
more settled political situations. Second, it can be suggested that the greater the 
competition for political power in minority areas and under conditions of regime change, 
the higher the probability that minority leaders will embrace a radical political agenda. 
Whether this larger and one can argue, “de-communized” claim, is accurate will depend, 
of course, on assessing its validity in contexts outside the postcommunist region.  
Let us now conclude this study by drawing some implications. One is that a large 
number of the variables often thought to be related to radicalization of minority demands 
fail to have a consistent or sizeable impact. This is important, but not because this study 
has eliminated these factors. “Elimination” is a term that is too insensitive to the limits of 
this study, as well as the limits, more generally, of establishing causality in the social 
sciences. Rather, what these “failures of explanation” suggest is that future studies cannot 
take for granted that these variables are pivotal. Indeed, by discovering some important 
and plausible sources of variation that are often overlooked, this study suggests that 
future work should give them some priority. Thus, future studies of minority politics and 
the demands of minority leaders on the state should pay attention to the role of 
international actors and the internal politics of minority regions (and see Csergo, 2006 for 
a similar point). 
A second implication is that short-term forces in general and processes of 
competition and political change in particular may be more critical in shaping minority 
demands and, as emphasized above, majority behavior as well than, say, longer-term 
considerations and, for that matter, cultural and economic variables. Put simply, this 
study speaks to the primacy of politics and political struggle and to the considerable 
influence of short-term changes in the political environment. In this sense, the insights 
that have emerged in this comparative study resonate well with emphases in studies of 
recent democratization, where short-term effects—for example, the distribution of power 
at the end of the authoritarian era and struggles for power, once political monopolies are 
deregulated—play a critical role in the direction taken in the transition from authoritarian 
rule (for a summary, see Bunce, 2003). It must be admitted, however, that the importance 
of such factors makes the job of an analyst very difficult. It is far easier to identify 
historical legacies, for example, given the benefits of the passage of time and the 
accumulation of studies than to read with confidence variations in fast-breaking 
developments. 
The literature on democratization also reminds us of a third implication. In that 
literature, there is a consensus, particularly for analysts of the postcommunist region, that 
competition is critical for the rise and sustainability of democracy. In this sense, 
competition is invariably a positive development, primarily because it speaks to 
constraints on authoritarian leaders in settings where they are losing power. However, 
while competition also features prominently in this study, it plays a different role. If one 
assumes that the dissolution of states, all else being equal, undermines international 
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 stability, then the scenario of regional cooperation with the center, as opposed to the 
dynamics associated with autonomy and especially secession, are preferable. 
Cooperation, it must be noted, is closely associated with the continued local hegemony of 
the communists. Moreover, it can also be argued that many of the regions in this study 
that moved in a secessionist direction fall far short of certain desirable dynamics, such as 
local stability, good economic performance, and liberal local politics. The point here is 
that, while one can support the right of minorities to have more rights and autonomy, 
both the attempts to create new states and success in doing so do not necessarily produce 
outcomes that serve minorities well. 
Finally, as noted throughout this analysis, this study has been designed to shed 
some light on an issue in heated debate among scholars and policy-makers; that is, 
whether ethnofederal states and other forms of institutional power-sharing contribute to 
inter-group cooperation and democratic politics or in fact undermine both developments. 
On the one hand, the very fact that minority regions featured very different kinds of 
relationships to their central governments remind us that arguments emphasizing either 
extreme—that is, either the high costs or the considerable benefits of ethnofederation—
are necessarily over-stated and over-simplified. This is hardly surprising. While political 
institutions are important, they do not stand alone. The details of how they work and the 
factors that combine with them to exaggerate or limit their costs and benefits are all 
important considerations. Just as important are two other factors that have received 
limited attention: the behavior of the center and the local politics of the region. The 
design of the state, of course, places certain parameters on both sets of factors. Thus, the 
center in ethnofederations, especially when the state and regime are new and ethnofederal 
arrangements are long in place, has a marked propensity to be nervous about its territory. 
At the same time and for similar reasons, minority-defined regions within new states that 
are well-established ethnofederations are likely to gravitate towards the goal of greater 
political and cultural autonomy. In this sense, ethnofederation, especially when it 
precedes regime and state transition, does not just reassure groups; it also tempts 
majorities to embrace aggressive nationalism, if not assimilationism and to resist at all 
costs further decentralization of the state and minorities to guard their autonomy at all 
costs and to define greater autonomy as both a worthwhile and necessary endeavor. 
These costs seem to be particularly pronounced in the particular and perhaps 
peculiar context of both communism and postcommunism. Where ethnofederations were 
nested (that is, where ethnofederal republics were located within ethnofederal states), as 
they were in all of the cases analyzed in this study, nationalist agendas very easily 
translated into secessionist agendas—especially since other alternatives, such as liberal 
nationalism or even liberalism, have been squeezed out. It is not accidental, therefore, 
that democratization has faced the greatest obstacles in the postcommunist region in two 
settings—where the communists stayed in power (as they did in most states in the region, 
old or new) and in those new and multinational states that inherited ethnofederalism from 
their communist past.  
Here, again, we find an interesting tension that harkens back to the discussion 
about competition and its relationship to minority leader agendas. Ethnofederalism may 
not have led in every case to secessionist politics, but ethnofederal regimes in the first 
decade of transition in the postcommunist world were associated with both escalation of 
nationalist violence and either fully authoritarian regimes or regimes caught between 
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 democracy and dictatorship. In this sense, ethnofederalism, especially when it is in place 
when transitions to democracy and statehood commence, can be a serious problem for 
both democracy and the state. However, these problems, we must remember, do not by 
any means dictate outcomes. Just as some regions in this study challenged state borders, 
others did not. Moreover, just as both Georgia and Serbia have moved in a more 
democratic direction over the past few years, so Russia and Azerbaijan have drifted in the 
opposite direction. In this sense, the impact of ethnofederation on both regimes and states 
depends not just on the institutional design of the state, but also other variables. With 
respect to democracy, the key issue has been the willingness and capacity of the liberal 
opposition, assisted by the international community, to carry out electoral revolutions that 
replace illiberal leaders with their liberal counterparts. With respect to the state and 
variations in the demands minority leaders place on the state, two critical factors matter: 
the role of the international community and the outcomes of struggles for power within 
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a Where the subunit leader accepts the existing center-regional relationship. The state is not in question. 
b Where the subunit leader demands moderate to significant and unprecedented political/cultural/economic 
autonomy (including sovereignty claims in some cases).  The state is not in question. 





Competing Explanations: State-Level and Majority Variables 
 Georgia Russia Serbia-Montenegro
Ethnofederation Yes Yes Yes 
State Socialist Legacy Yes Yes Yes 
New State Yes Yes Yes 
Regime Transition Yes Yes Yes 
State Capacity Low Low Low 
Territorially Compact Minorities Yes Yes Yes 
Mobilization Against Former Statea Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Variation In Income Large Large Large 
Timing of Mobilizationb Early Late Middle 
Size of Dominant Nation 68% 82% 63% 
Center/Periphery of Former State Periphery Center Center 
Diaspora of Dominant Nation Small Large Large 
History of Resistance?c Yes No No 
Prior Independence?d Yes No Yes 
Communists Maintain Power? No Mixed Yes 
Majority Religion Christian Christian Christian 
Minorities of Other Religions Yes Yes Yes 
 
a The distinction here is between those republics within Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union that exhibited nationalist 
mobilization against the state versus those that did not (see Beissinger, 2002; Bunce, 1990). 
b Early refers to nationalist mobilization before the 1980s; middle refers to mobilization during the 1980s; and late 
refers to mobilization during the disintegration of communist party hegemony. For Serbia-Montenegro, the focus 
is on Serbia, though with the recognition that protests in Belgrade in the early 1980s were both liberal and 
nationalist and primarily the former (see Gagnon, 2005). 
c The key issue here is whether the state, then republic, resisted incorporation into the Soviet or Yugoslav state. 
d Of course, Georgian independence was short-lived (a reaction to the Bolshevik revolution), whereas Serbian 
independence was much longer in duration.  
Table 3
Competing Explanations of Subunit Behavior Divided into Status Quo, 















Degastan Moderate * Poor Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Montenegro 
(1989-1997) 
Large Slightly  
Below 
No No No No No 
Vovjvodina 
(1989-2000) 
Small Rich Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjaria Large Rich Yes No No No No 
Kosovo 
(1989-1997) 
Large Poor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Montenegro 
(1997-2003) 
Large Slightly  
Below 
No No Yes Small No 
Vovjvodina 
(2000-2003) 
Small Rich Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tatarstan Medium Rich Yes Yes Yes Yes No** 
Abkhazia Small Rich Yes Yes Yes No No 
Chechyna Large Poor Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Kosovo 
(1997-2003) 
Large Poor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nagorno-
Karabakh 
Large Similar Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S. Ossetia Large Rich No Yes Yes Yes No 
 
* Dagestan is unusually diverse.  Avartsi, the largest group, is 28%; Dargintsi – 16.3%; Russians – 12.5%; and Dezginy – 12.2% 
** In Tatarstan, Tatars are a majority in the neighboring subunit, Bashkortostan.  Tartars are also the largest minority in the Russian Federation 




Competing Explanations of Subunit Behavior Divided into Status Quo, Reform and Secessionist Demands: 










in Former State e
Local 
Representation f
Dagestan Perimeter Yes No No Changed (-) Medium 
Montenegro 
(1989-1997) 
Perimeter No Yes No Stable Medium 
Vojvodina 
(1989-2000) 
Perimeter No No No Changed (+) Low / Medium 
Adjaria Perimeter Yes No No Stable Medium 
Kosovo 
(1989-1997) 
Perimeter Yes No No Changed (+) Low/Medium 
Montenegro 
(1997-2003) 
Perimeter No Yes No Stable Medium 
Vojvodina  
(2000-2003) 
Perimeter No No No Changed (+) Low 
Tatarstan Enclosed Yes Yes No Stable Medium 
Abkhazia Perimeter Yes No Yes Changed (-) High 
Chechnya Perimeter Yes No No Changed (-) Low 
Kosovo 
(1997-2003) 





Yes No Yes Changed (+) Medium 
S. Ossetia Close to 
Perimeter 
No No Yes Changed (+) Medium 
 
a The argument here is that subunits on the border of the state are more likely to secede.  
b The argument here is that early resistance provides a basis for later secession. 
c The argument here is that prior statehood provides a basis for secession. 
d The argument here is that, when the center of the former state allies with the subunit against the republic, that subunit is more likely to secede. 
e All of these subunits had administrative identity during the communist period. However, their rankings in some cases changed.  The argument is that change is 
critical, with upgraded status “tempting” statehood and downgraded status producing resentment. 





Competing Explanations: Political and Military Factors during Transition 
 Nationalist Movements 
in Republics a
Communists Retain 
Power in New State  b
International Support for 
Autonomy/Secession  c
Communists Retain 
Power in Region?  d
Dagestan Yes/ Late Divided & Dominant No Yes 
Montenegro 
(1989-1997) 





Yes/Early Yes, But Less From 
1997-2000 
No Yes 
Adjaria Yes/Early No No Competitive 
Kosovo 
(1989-1997) 
Yes/Early Yes Yes* Competitive 
Montenegro 
(1997-2003) 
Yes/Early No Yes, Then No Competitive 
Vojvodina 
(2000-2003) 
Yes/Early No No Competitive 
Tatarstan Yes/Late Divided No Competitive 
Abkhazia Yes/Early No Yes** No 
Chechnya Yes/Late Divided No** No 
Kosovo 
(1997-2003) 
Yes/Early Yes/No (2000) Yes** No 
Nagorno-Karabakh Yes/Very Late Yes Yes** No 
1 The qu re is whether the repub ation (Russians, Georg s, and Serbs) mobilized ag e larger state (the Soviet Uni nd Yugoslavia) 
and, if so, before or during state dissolution.  The assumption is that earlier mobilizations produce a more exclusivist and illiberal nationalism which in turn 











b There are 3 possibilities here:  divided power among liberals and communists (Russia); dominance of communists (Azerbaijan, Serbia & Montenegro up to 
2000, though less 1997-2000); and defeat of the communists followed by a mixed communist/nationalist alliance (in Georgia to 2003), and liberals and 
nationalists (Serbia-Montenegro, 2000-2003). 
c International support can be purposive or accidental (for example, Russian support of S. Ossetia and Abkhazia vs. leakage of armaments from Albania to 
Kosovo), and intervention can be of a regional power (Russia) or the international community (as in the Montenegro case.) Those with one asterisk seek 
autonomy; those with two asterisks seek secession. 
d The question here is whether the communists, the nationalist opposition or competition between the two dominated political developments in the subunit during 
the specified period.  However, in Adjaria and Tatarstan (in the middle category or reform) communist power was more significant. 
